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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This public employee whistleblower case arises from a series of retaliatory

adverse actions the Idaho State Police (ISP) took against its employee, Detective
Brandon Eller (Eller), as a result of his protected activity under Idaho law.
Specifically, ISP retaliated against Eller for testifying against a Payette County
police officer at that officer’s preliminary hearing, and for later objecting to ISP’s
directive requiring members of the Crash Reconstruction Unit (CRU) to destroy all
but the final versions of their reconstruction reports. A Jury found in Eller’s favor,
and Eller now appeals because the District Court erred in making two rulings that
precluded Eller from recovering the entirety of the damages awarded by the Jury.

B.

Statement of the Case
On January 6, 2015 Eller filed his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

wherein he alleged ISP unlawfully retaliated against him in violation of Idaho Code
section 6-2101 et seq., the Idaho Protection of Public Employee Act (Whistleblower
Act). See Clerk’s Record (“R.”), 1 pp. 20-26. Eller later filed an Amended Complaint

Citations to the Clerk’s Record (“R.”) will be followed by the page numbers: e.g., “R., p. _.”
Citations to the Transcripts (“Tr.”). The court reporters produced four transcripts identified as
follows: Tr.; Tr. 06.30.16; Tr. 12.05.16; and Tr. 08.17.17. These will be followed by the page numbers,
and line numbers where appropriate: e.g., “Tr. 08.17.17, p. _, L. _.”
Citations to the Exhibits (“Ex.”) will be designated as “Pltf. Ex.” for Plaintiff’s Exhibits, “Def. Ex.” for
Defendant’s Exhibits, and “Ct. Ex.” for Court’s Exhibits followed by the Exhibit number and/or bates
or page numbers where appropriate: e.g., “Pltf. Ex. _, _”.
1
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and Demand for Jury Trial adding allegations that ISP subjected him to additional
retaliatory adverse actions after the filing of his original Complaint. R., pp. 372-381.
Eller also added a second cause of action of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
R., pp. 380-81. ISP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of
Eller’s claims, which was denied by the District Court on August 2, 2017. R., pp.
571-98, 1592-610. The case was tried to a Jury in August 2017, and below is a
summary of pertinent facts presented during trial.
Eller became an ISP patrol trooper in 1997, and in late 2004 was appointed
as one of the founding members of the newly-formed ISP Collision Reconstruction
Unit. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 338-41. In 2007, Eller became a POST-certified 2 instructor
for crash investigation and started doing trainings and presentations on crash
investigation and reconstruction for POST, ISP, and other agencies. Tr. 08.17.17,
pp. 209-10, 344-46, 420-22; Pltf. Ex. 23. Eller consistently taught POST’s
introduction to crash investigation course and ISP’s basic and advanced crash
investigation trainings. Tr., p. 845; Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 209-10, 421-22. Eller was
widely recognized in the field as a “phenomenal reconstructionist” and the trainings
he provided were regarded as the “very best instruction possible.” Tr., p. 845, L. 6-9;
Tr. 08.17.17, p. 344; Pltf. Ex. 16, p.000495; Pltf. Ex. 27.

2 This meant he was certified by the Police Officer Standards and Training (POST) to instruct other
law enforcement officers or trainees.
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For many years, one of Eller’s primary career goals was to become the ISP
statewide Reconstruction Program Manager. Tr. 08.17.17, p. 368. As was
documented by ISP, Eller was on track to accomplish this goal. Tr. 08.17.17, p. 369;
Pltf. Ex. 19, p. 000517. For example, in 2008, he was assigned to be the District 3
liaison for the Inter-Agency Crash Team, and for portions of 2011 and 2013, Eller
filled in as the interim Statewide Program Manager. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 378-79, 51415. Eller served as a fulltime reconstructionist in the CRU for 9 years and was the
longest-serving member of the CRU. Tr. 08.17.17, p. 382. In short, his future in
leading crash reconstruction at ISP was bright. However, in October 2011, a fatal
car crash involving a Payette County deputy would end up significantly changing
the course of Eller’s career at ISP.

1. The Sloan Crash and Investigation
On October 18, 2011, a Payette County Sheriff Deputy, Scott Sloan, was
involved in a car crash with civilian Barry Johnson. Tr., pp. 546, 656; Tr. 08.17.17,
pp. 20-22. In response to a 911 call, Deputy Sloan was traveling above the speed
limit on a two-lane rural highway, where he came upon Johnson’s jeep. Tr. 08.17.17,
pp. 21, 111. ISP Officers estimated that Deputy Sloan was driving at approximately
114-115 miles per hour just prior to the crash. Tr., pp. 737, 1021; Tr. 08.17.17, pp.
354-55. Deputy Sloan started to pass Johnson on the left when Johnson turned into
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his driveway, causing Sloan to crash into the jeep. Johnson died as a result of the
crash. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 699, 716.
ISP assigned Trooper Justin Klitch to investigate the crash and assigned
Crash

Reconstructionist

Corporal

Quinn

Carmack

to

perform

the

crash

reconstruction. Tr., pp. 701, 729; Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 13-14. As a part of the
investigation, it was discovered that Johnson had a range of Blood Alcohol
Concentration (BAC) results at the time of the crash, some of which were above the
legal limit. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 35-36, 47. While Carmack did not believe that
Johnson’s BAC was a causal factor in the crash, Klitch disagreed and believed that
alcohol had to be the cause of the crash. Tr., p. 756; Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 35-37.
Eller, who was the lead reconstructionist in District 3, was assigned to assist
Klitch in interviewing Deputy Sloan on or about November 30, 2011. Tr., p. 745; Tr.
08.17.17, pp. 350-51. Based on this interview and other information Eller learned
about the crash, Eller supported Carmack’s conclusion that Johnson’s BAC was not
a causal factor in the crash; rather both Carmack and Eller believed that Sloan had
been driving too fast and should not have attempted to pass the jeep (i.e., was
operating his vehicle in an unsafe or reckless manner). Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 34-37, 348,
358-60, 492, 506; Pltf. Ex. 1.
After Carmack’s reconstruction report was peer reviewed by two other
reconstructionists, it was sent for final approval by the CRU Statewide Coordinator,
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Specialist Fred Rice. The final report approved by Rice identified the following as
causational factors: that Sloan was driving too fast, in an “unsafe manner” and in
“reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 14-16, 19-20, 34-35;
Pltf. Ex. 1.
Just prior to the final report approval, District 3’s top commanders, Captain
Steve Richardson and Lieutenant Sheldon Kelley, called Eller into a meeting.
Believing that Eller could or would influence Carmack’s conclusions, the
commanders tried to get Eller to agree that alcohol was a cause of the crash and
that it was Johnson who had made an unsafe left turn. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 355, 35960. Eller refused to capitulate and the contentious meeting ended. Tr. 08.17.17, pp.
246-47.
The same day that Carmack’s report was approved, Cpt. Richardson and Lt.
Kelley called Carmack and Rice into a meeting and had a “heated” discussion,
wherein they made it clear that they believed that Johnson’s BAC caused the crash.
Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 24-25, 37-39, 50-51. Lt. Kelley was so angry about the situation
that he was yelling, and Carmack felt pressured to change his final report despite
the fact that he believed he could not honestly testify that alcohol was a cause of the
crash. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 37-39, 50-51. Carmack made the mandated changes which
were ultimately approved by Rice. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 40-42, 51-52; Pltf. Ex. 130. The
difference between the revised report and the original report are telling:
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I

ORIGINAL FINAL REPORT
Causationa l Factors

.
.

I

Officer wa s traveling an average of 115 miles per hour from Custer Road
to the beginning of the braking marks of the Ford.
Officer was traveling a minimum of 101 miles per hour when he began to

.
.

REVISED FINAL REPORT
Conclusions
The author of this report reserves the right to amend these findings and conclusions due
to any change of information contained in this investigation or additiona l discovered
information and or evidence

.

Officer was operating an authorized emergency vehicle at an approximate

brake .

speed of 115 miles per hour on a posted 55 mile per hour rural highway

Officer made an unsafe pass .

while attempting to pass another vehicle .

Officer was operating an authorized emergency vehicle in an unsafe
manner by driving without due regard for the safety of all person and
reckless disregard for the safety of others.

.
.
.

Officer was traveling a minimum of 101 miles per hour when he began to
brake .
Jeep Driver turned left in front of an emergency vehicle, which had its
emergency lights and siren activated .
Jeep Driver had a femoral artery blood alcohol level of .080 .

R., p. 1641; Tr. 08.17.17 pp. 43-48; Pltf. Ex. 1, p. 9, Pltf. Ex. 130, p. Eller000195;.
In short, by late 2011/early 2012, the opinions about this crash were clearly
delineated within ISP:
•

The crash reconstructionists, including Eller, Carmack, and Rice, believed
that Sloan acted recklessly, unsafely, and caused the crash that killed
Johnson.

•

Cpt. Richardson, Lt. Kelley and Klitch believed that, because Johnson had
a BAC above the legal limit, alcohol must have been a cause of the crash.

2. The Sloan Preliminary Hearing and ISP’s Immediate Retaliation
After conducting his investigation, Gem County Prosecutor Richard Linville
charged Deputy Sloan with felony vehicular manslaughter. Tr., p. 700; Pltf. Ex. 99,
p. KELLEY-OPS000332. A preliminary hearing was held on April 13, 2012 and
Prosecutor Linville called both Carmack and Eller to testify at the hearing. Tr.
08.17.17, pp. 11, 58-59, 346. Both reconstructionists testified that Johnson’s BAC
level was not a cause of the crash and that Deputy Sloan was driving recklessly and
in an unsafe manner. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 58-59, 348, 505-06. Additionally, both Eller
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and Carmack testified that Carmack had been required by ISP commanders to
change the original crash reconstruction report and issue a revised, second report.
Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 60, 350. On the other hand, the defense called Klitch to testify. He
disagreed with the other reconstructionists’ testimony and was definitive in his
opinion that alcohol caused the crash because Johnson had a BAC level above the
legal limit. Tr., p. 756.
Klitch had asked his supervisor, Sergeant Ketchum, to attend the
preliminary hearing. During the hearing, Ketchum sent text messages to Lt. Kelley,
who immediately shared the text messages with other commanders including Cpt.
Richardson. One of the text messages indicated that Carmack was “throwing you
guys under the bus on the stand.” Tr., p. 517, L. 5-14, pp. 525, 730; Tr. 08.17.17, pp.
167, 771-72. ISP’s response to Carmack’s and Eller’s testimony was immediate.
During a meeting the same day, ISP command staff gathered in Major Kevin
Hudgens’ office to discuss the preliminary hearing. Tr., p. 519; Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 77072. Rice was summoned into the meeting where he heard a Major say that Carmack
and Eller would “be lucky to have their jobs patrolling nights and weekends,” or
words to that effect. Tr. 08.17.17, p. 169, L. 20-25, pp. 770, 773, L. 1-3. Lieutenant
Colonel Kedrick Wills expressed his dismay at Carmack’s and Eller’s testimony,
stating: “I cannot believe that the Idaho State Police is going to send a deputy to
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prison.” Tr. 08.17.17, p. 773, L. 4-6. Soon thereafter, Eller learned that Ketchum
was telling others that Eller lied on the witness stand. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 366, 503.
The retaliatory motives immediately affected ISP’s perception and evaluation
of Eller. For example, Eller’s 2011 performance review, given to him just prior to
Sloan’s

preliminary

hearing,

provided

an

overall

rating

of

“significant

accomplishment” (the highest rating possible). Pltf. Ex. 16. Eller also received a
very prestigious award (the Samson award) for being the top patrol officer in
District 3 for the year. Tr., pp. 646-47; Tr. 08.17.17, p. 343. In contrast, when Eller
was evaluated in April 2012 (shortly after the preliminary hearing), Eller’s
performance rating was downgraded a level and he was accused of causing
“dissention within the Region 3 Patrol ranks.” Pltf. Ex. 17, p. RFP001541. He was
also instructed to “soften[] his opinions on confrontational matters and be[] more
open to feedback.” Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 360-62; Pltf. Ex. 17, p. RFP0001540. Eller
attributed these negative statements to the testimony he gave during the
preliminary hearing. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 361-62, 365. This negative evaluation affected
Eller’s eligibility for pay raises. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 367-68.

3. ISP’s Directive to Destroy Drafts
As a result of Sloan’s preliminary hearing, ISP issued an edict that all peer
review reports should be destroyed. Specifically, on July 29, 2013, Maj. Hudgens
sent an email to all District Captains directing them that “CRU members will not
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keep draft copies of their [peer review] reports in the official case file. As is current
practice within ISP, those reports should be destroyed.” Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 78-79, 37071; Pltf. Ex. 83. When Eller received this email, he was concerned because he knew
from his training that everything created during an investigation is potentially
discoverable under Brady v. Maryland. 3 Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 372-76; Pltf. Ex. 156.
Eller approached two of his commanding officers (Lt. Doty and Cpt. Kelley)
and expressed concerns that the directive could cause a Brady issue, leaving officers
unable to turn over exculpatory evidence. Eller also stated that he thought “legal,”
(i.e. ISP’s deputy attorney general) should be asked to render a decision regarding
the legality of the directive. Both Lt. Doty and Cpt. Kelley ignored Eller’s concerns
and made it clear that he was to follow the directive and destroy peer review
reports. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 373-76. Eller refused to follow the directive, yet he was
notified that peer review reports had been destroyed in a number of fatal crash files.
Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 79-81, 376; Pltf. Ex. 135.

4. ISP’s Ongoing Retaliation
Things only got worse for Eller after he questioned the legality of the
directive to destroy documents. Specifically, thereafter:
•

Lt. Doty told Eller that Command did not believe that he (Eller) supported
the CRU and would be removed if he did not change. Cpt. Kelley informed
Eller that he was purposely being left out of discussions regarding CRU

3 In Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1197 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court established that a
prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused.
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changes. Tr. 08.17.17, p. 383. Additionally, Lt. Doty told other employees
that Eller was just a “disgruntled employee.” Tr., pp. 813, 927; Tr.
08.17.17, pp. 370, 439.
•

In early 2014, Lt. Doty directed Rice to make various edits to Eller’s 2013
evaluation, which diminished many of the complimentary statements
about Eller. Rice was also directed to change Eller’s “significant
accomplishment” rating to a “valuable contributor” rating, the next level
down. Tr., pp. 929-34; Pltf. Ex. 18.

Additionally, ISP made many retaliatory changes to the CRU that directly
and negatively impacted Eller’s job duties and benefits. For example:
•

In October 2013, the CRU was “restructured” and Eller was placed back
on patrol. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 72-74, 379-81; Pltf. Ex. 39. As a result, Eller
(who had historically worked a regular day shift Monday through Friday
since becoming a fulltime member of the CRU in 2004) was required to
rotate through night and weekend shifts. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 381-82. Eller
testified that these actions were a direct result of his protected activity
and had a negative impact on his work and home life. Tr. 08.17.17, pp.
381, 384-87, 405.

•

In January 2014, Eller was informed in a group email that “ISP would no
longer have a CRU in any District, therefore we will not have need of a
supervisor.” Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 75-77, 387; Pltf. Ex. 40. This email is how
ISP notified Eller that he was relieved of his interim statewide CRU
coordinator duties, which he had been performing for the prior nine
months. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 387-88. After relieving Eller of these duties, Cpt.
Kelley reassigned them to two other ISP reconstructionists. Tr. 08.17.17,
pp. 388-90.

•

At around this same time, ISP interfered with Eller’s reconstruction of a
fatal school bus accident. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 409-13.

•

Because of the string of negative actions directed at Eller and the CRU,
and given his concerns about the directives to destroy draft reports and
make changes to his own reconstruction reports, Eller felt compelled to
step away from doing crash reconstruction work, effectively ending his
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career in that field. Eller continues to struggle with this significantly
difficult decision. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 413-17.
•

In June 2014, ISP rejected Eller’s application for a pay increase under
ISP’s Choice Point Program for instructors without explanation. 4 When
Eller filed a problem-solving request on the issue (which was also
ultimately denied), he was told that he could no longer teach and that any
training should be assigned to a different trooper. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 418-29.
Eller testified that these denials of his pay increase and the restriction of
his ability to continue to do trainings were related to his whistleblowing
activities. Tr. 08.17.17, p. 429.

•

In Spring 2016, Eller applied for a Sergeant promotion. Although his
scores were above the required level, ISP halted Eller’s scoring during the
middle of the process, which effectively kept him from advancing to the
next level of review. Thus, ISP never considered Eller as a candidate for
the position, or any other Sergeant openings over the next six months. Tr.,
pp. 778, 781-82, 785-90, 839-42, 1118-20; Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 434-36, 438-44,
457-58.

5. Eller’s Emotional Distress
Eller and his wife, Kristi Eller, testified about the emotional impact the
above events have had on Eller which included the following evidence: Eller was
“very proud to be an Idaho state trooper,” 5 and he loved doing reconstruction work.
Tr., pp. 949-50. His goal was to become the manager of the ISP crash reconstruction
program. Tr., pp. 949-51. After the retaliation because of Eller’s testimony at the
Sloan hearing, “he shut down … he lost the skill to communicate about the kids,” 6
he was “grouchy” and all he wanted to do was watch TV. Tr., p. 956, L. 4-9. He
Eller had been instructing since 2007 and had been recognized as the “go-to” trainer on crash
reconstructions. Thus, he was eligible for the Choice Point pay increase. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 418-20.
5
Tr., p. 948, L. 16; p. 949, L. 8-9.
6 Tr., p. 955, L. 2-12.
4
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stopped interacting with the kids, stopped cooking for the kids, he lost 15 to 20
pounds, and quit working out. Tr., pp. 955-57.
When he was reassigned out of the CRU and back to regular patrol, he was
“devastat[ed]: you have your whole career path, your whole direction you want to
go, and all of the sudden it’s gone. It’s changed.” Tr. 08.17.17, p. 386, L. 14-17. He
had trouble sleeping, headaches, started getting sick more often and having skin
issues. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 415-16. His wife, Kristi testified that it was “heartbreaking”
to watch him pushed out of reconstruction. Tr., p. 961, L.7-17.

6. Jury Trial Proceedings and Disposition
The jury trial began on August 14, 2017 and on August 29th, the Jury
returned its Special Verdict in favor of Eller, finding ISP unlawfully retaliated
against him in violation of the Whistleblower Act, and that ISP negligently inflicted
severe emotional distress on Eller. R., pp. 1827-29.
During the case, Eller sought emotional distress damages pursuant to both
the Whistleblower Act and for the negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
R., pp. 380-81. However, on August 24, 2017, after briefing and argument by both
parties, the District Court ruled that, as a matter of law, the Jury was precluded
from awarding Eller emotional distress damages under the Whistleblower Act. Tr.,
pp. 768-74. The District Court formalized this ruling in a written Memorandum
Decision and Order entered on September 1, 2017. R., pp. 1830-36. Because of the
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District Court’s ruling, the Special Verdict form only permitted the Jury to award
non-economic damages under Eller’s NIED claim. R., pp. 1827-29.
After the Jury’s verdict, ISP moved for a reduction of Eller’s emotional
distress damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-926. R., pp. 1838-46. ISP failed to
reference its intent to rely on section 6-926 prior to this motion. section 6-926, part
of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), states in relevant part:
The combined, aggregate liability of a governmental entity and
its employee for damages, costs and attorney’s fees under this chapter .
. . as the result of any one (1) occurrence or accident regardless of the
number of persons injured or the number of claimants, shall not exceed
and is limited to five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
I.C. § 6-926(1) (emphasis added).
After briefing and argument, the District Court interpreted “occurrences”
under section 6-926 to equate to adverse actions in Whistleblower claims, and
reduced the Jury’s emotional distress verdict from $1,500,000 to $1,000,000, stating
that “the Court can easily determine that the jury found at least two adverse
actions.” R., p. 1993 (emphasis added). The Court entered judgment on December
12, 2017, including the reduced emotional distress compensation and the Jury’s
verdict for economic damages of $30,528.97 as a result of ISP’s violations of the
Whistleblower Act. R., p. 1997. On March 26, 2018, the Court entered an Amended
Judgment, incorporating its decision awarding Eller attorneys’ fees and costs. R.,
pp. 2069-70.
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Both ISP and Eller filed Notices of Appeal on January 23, 2018. R., pp. 19992011. The Appeals were consolidated for briefing and oral argument under Appeal
No. 45698. See Order May 24, 2018.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

Section 6-2105 of the Whistleblower Act sets forth “remedies for

employee bringing action,” and in subsection (1) defines damages as “damages for
injury or loss caused by each violation...” Section 6-2105(2) authorizes an employee
to bring an action for “actual damages.” In light of the plain language of section 62105,

Did the District Court err by ruling as a matter of law that the
Whistleblower Act precludes an award of compensatory damages for
emotional distress injuries?
B.

After the Jury returned its verdict, ISP moved the District Court to

reduce the jury’s emotional distress award raising section 6-926 for the first time
and arguing there was only a single “occurrence” of ISP’s retaliatory conduct. The
District Court found that there were at least two occurrences, and partially granted
ISP’s motion reducing the Jury’s verdict. Based upon ISP’s failure to raise section 6926 during pre-trial litigation or during trial,

Did the District Court err in finding that ISP had not waived its right
to raise the cap under section 6-926 by waiting to raise it until after a
verdict was returned?

APPELLANT ELLER’S OPENING BRIEF - 14

And, if this Court finds no waiver, should the case be remanded to the
District Court with direction to properly apply the governing law by
making findings pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a)
regarding how many occurrences caused Eller to suffer emotional
distress?
C.

The Whistleblower Act provides for an award of costs and reasonable

attorney fees to a prevailing employee. I.C. §§ 6-2106(5), 6-2105(1). If Eller prevails
on appeal,

Is Eller entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 40 and 41 and the Whistleblower Act?
III. ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review
This Court’s review regarding questions of law is de novo. O’Loughlin v.

Circle A Constr., 112 Idaho 1048, 1051, 739 P.2d 347, 350 (1987). Interpretation of a
statute or rule is purely a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. Ashton Urban Renewal Agency v. Ashton Mem’l, Inc., 155 Idaho 309, 311
P.3d 730, 732 (2013). Likewise, questions of compliance with the rules of procedure
are questions of law, such that this Court exercises free review. In Re: SRBA Case

No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 65-23531 and 65-23532, Black Canyon Irrigation Dist. v.
State, 163 Idaho 144, 149, 408 P.3d 899, 904 (2018)(“Black Canyon Irrigation
Dist.”).
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B.

Summary of the Argument
“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 7;

see also I.R.C.P. 38(a). This constitutional right “should be carefully safeguarded by
the courts” and “it is not the trial court’s prerogative to disregard or nullify [the
jury’s findings] by making finding of [its] own.” Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho
817, 826, 761 P.2d 1169, 1178 (1988)(internal citation and quotation omitted).
In this appeal, Eller seeks to restore the Jury’s verdict that he suffered/will
continue to suffer emotional distress due to ISP’s retaliatory actions against him, by
reinstatement of the verdict in full. The District Court improperly reduced that
verdict by $500,000 based on ISP’s belated post-trial arguments. Ultimately, Eller
requests this Court make at least one holding, if not more than one, that would
restore the Jury’s determination of the full amount of his compensatory damages.
As further set forth below, there are three equally and independently
sufficient holdings that would accomplish restoration of the Jury’s verdict: (1)
reversal of the District Court’s Order that compensatory emotional distress
damages are not an available remedy under the Whistleblower Act; (2) reversal of
the District Court’s Order concluding that ISP did not waive its right to assert a
reduction of damages pursuant to section 6-926; or (3) vacating the Court’s Order
regarding the reduction of damages and remanding the case to the District Court to
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enter findings of fact pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) regarding the
number of occurrences under section 6-926, consistent with the evidence at trial. 7

C.

Compensatory Emotional Distress Damages are Recoverable under the Plain
Meaning of the Whistleblower Act.
The District Court ruled that compensatory emotional distress damages were

not an available remedy under the Whistleblower Act. R., p. 1836. As discussed
below, this ruling should be reversed based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of
the statute and section 6-2105 in particular. As discussed below, section 6-2105’s
provision of remedies for a whistleblower, and its definition of damages, leaves no
doubt that the Legislature provided for compensatory emotional distress damages
under the Act. As discussed in sections 2 and 3 below, this interpretation is
consistent, not contrary as the District Court found, with section 6-2106 and this
Court’s holding in Wright v. Ada County, 160 Idaho 491, 376 P.3d 58 (2016).

Eller recognizes remand on this point does not guarantee restoration of the Jury’s compensatory
damages verdict. However, the District Court’s following statement is noteworthy:
In light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial, the Court is confident that
the jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant took more than two adverse
actions against Plaintiff . . . . It is the Court’s opinion that the disparity between the
two awards indicates that one could rationally conclude that the jury based the NIED
award on more than the two adverse actions it found under the IPPEA.
R., p. 1993, n. 5 (emphasis added). As such, if this Court deems it proper to vacate and remand on
this issue, Eller requests that this Court instruct the District Court as to the scope of its relevant
authority under Rule 49(a) so that the Court can properly apply the governing law.

7
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1. The ordinary meaning of the Act’s remedial provision provides for
compensatory emotional distress damages.
Statutory interpretation “must begin with the literal words of the statute;
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the
statute must be construed as a whole.” Wright, 160 Idaho at 497, 376 P.3d at 64
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). If the statute lacks ambiguity, “this Court
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” Id.
Resolving this issue requires this Court to interpret the provisions of Idaho
Code section 6-2105 to determine whether compensatory emotional distress
damages are an available remedy under the Whistleblower Act. Section 6-2105 is
unambiguous and allows this remedy. Section 6-2105 reads, in relevant part:
6-2105. REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEE BRINGING ACTION — PROOF
REQUIRED.
(1) As used in this section, "damages" means damages for
injury or loss caused by each violation of this chapter,
and includes court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter
may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief
or actual damages, or both, within one hundred eighty
(180) days after the occurrence of the alleged violation
of this chapter.

I.C. § 6-2105 (emphasis added).
The Legislature clearly provided that employees are entitled to seek
“actual damages” for “injury or loss” under the Whistleblower Act. This plainly
includes compensatory emotional distress damages. To wit, Merriam-Webster’s
online Law Dictionary defines actual damages as “damages deemed to
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compensate the injured party for losses sustained as a direct result of the injury
suffered – called also compensatory damages.” See Merriam-Webster.com,

damages (Aug. 31, 2018); accord Black’s Law Dictionary 471 (10th ed. 2014). In
turn, this Court has previously recognized that compensatory damages include
emotional distress damages. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 134
Idaho 464, 467, 4 P.3d 1115, 1118 (2000) (Idaho has recognized a jury’s right to
award general compensatory damages for emotional distress since prior to the
adoption of the Idaho Constitution).
Likewise, this Court has already interpreted the words “actual damages”
broadly. First, in O’Dell v. Basabe, this Court interpreted “actual damages” as used
in the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) as “commonly understood as those actual
losses caused by the conduct at issue.” 119 Idaho 796, 811, 810 P.2d 1082, 1097
(1991). As such, this Court held that actual damages were broad enough to
encompass front pay damages even though the statute specifically mentioned only
back pay damages. Id.
Second, in Paterson v. State, this Court upheld plaintiff’s recovery for her
embarrassment and humiliation as a result of a hostile work environment under
the IHRA. 128 Idaho 494, 503, 915 P.2d 724, 733 (1996). By affirming these
damages, this Court implicitly concluded that the IHRA’s “actual damage” language
includes “compensatory [emotional distress] damages.” Id.; see also Garcia v. PSI
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Envtl. Sys., 2012 WL 2359496 at *8-9 (D. Idaho June 20, 2012) (Judge Lodge held
“actual damages” includes emotional distress damages under the IHRA). 8
Thus, this Court need do nothing more than give the Legislature’s words
their plain and ordinary meaning, as previously interpreted by this Court, to
hold that the Whistleblower Act provides for emotional distress damages. The
Legislature’s deliberate drafting decision, here including actual damages for injury
as a remedy available to whistleblowers, is dispositive. In Re: Decision on Joint

Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Idaho Supreme Court (Dkt. 31, 32, 45),
Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Corizon LLC, 2018 WL 472145 at *6, ___ P.3d ___ (2018).
No further statutory construction is necessary, because Idaho courts are “reluctant
to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and . . . unwilling to insert words into a
statute” in deference to the legislature’s intent. Wright, 160 Idaho at 498, 376 P.3d
at 65.

2. The District Court erred in concluding section 6-2106 trumps section 62105 and precludes emotional distress damages.
The District Court took the position that section 6-2106 restricts a
whistleblower’s remedies to just the six (6) items listed therein. As support for this
holding, the District Court relied on this Court’s decision in Wright, supra. 9

8 Non-published
9

cases are attached as an addendum to the Brief.
The import of Wright’s holding is discussed below in section 3.
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However, this Court need simply look to the plain language of section 6-2106 which
reads in total:
6-2106. COURT ORDERS FOR VIOLATION OF CHAPTER. A court,
in rendering a judgment brought under this chapter, may
order any or all of the following:
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the
provisions of this act;
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same
position held before the adverse action, or to an
equivalent position;
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and
seniority rights;
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other
remuneration;
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and
attorneys’ fees;
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five
hundred dollars ($500), which shall be submitted to the
state treasurer for deposit in the general fund.

I.C. § 6-2106 (emphasis added). As explained below, the District Court erred when
it ruled that this is an exclusive list of the only remedies allowable under the Act,
effectively nullifying the plain language of section 6-2105.

a. This Court must give section 6-2106 its plain meaning without adding
words.
This Court “has been unwilling to insert words into a statute that the Court
believes the legislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently.” Wright, 160
Idaho at 498, 376 P.3d at 65. There is no language in section 6-2106 that would
indicate it is exclusive, such as, for example, “may only.” Nor is there any language
in section 6-2106 that indicates an intent to supersede the preceding sections of the
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Act. Instead, it says that a court “may order any or all of the following.” This Court
has long held that use of the word “may” in a statute expresses discretion and
permissiveness. Boyd-Davis v. Macomber Law, PLLC, 157 Idaho 949, 954, 342 P.3d
661, 666 (2015) (quoting Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995)).
Use of the word “may” in section 6-2106 is permissive, allowing courts the discretion
to enter some, all, or none of the orders listed. That discretion does not operate to
limit the availability of other remedies or relief as set forth in other sections of the
Act, namely section 6-2105’s mandate that “actual damages” are recoverable.
In short, there is nothing in the plain language of section 6-2106 indicative of
intent to limit whistleblower’s relief to only the discretionary court-ordered items,
and/or to the exclusion of the other provisions in the Act.

b. This Court must not read section 6-2106 in isolation.
Statutory interpretation requires this Court to “ascertain and give effect to
the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word
therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions.” Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty.

Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d 458, 465 (2008). See also State v.
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2013) (court must consider the statute
as a whole and it “must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so
that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant”) (internal quotations omitted).
The District Court’s holding below operates to give no meaning or effect to section 6-

APPELLANT ELLER’S OPENING BRIEF - 22

2105’s provision of remedies including “actual damages” for “injury or loss.” I.C. § 62105(1) & (2) (emphasis added). Section 6-2105 clearly and plainly allows a
whistleblower to recover actual, a/k/a compensatory, damages for emotional
injuries.
While section 6-2106 enumerates types of losses that can be compensated via
a court order, nothing in that provision provides any enumeration of compensation
for injury. In fact, the items listed in section 6-2106 include relief for losses which
are typically provided by a court after a jury verdict in favor of the whistleblower
(i.e., injunction, civil fine, reinstatement, or attorney fees and costs), as opposed to
relief determined by a jury, like compensatory damages for emotional injuries. This
interpretation allows this Court to give both sections their plain meaning, while
also ensuring that none will be “void, superfluous, or redundant.” Dunlap, 155
Idaho at 361, 313 P.3d at 17. Such reading is also consistent with the overall intent
of the Act to ensure whistleblowers who have suffered retaliation can recover for
their injuries and losses.
The above interpretation is also consistent with the holding in Brown v. City

of Caldwell, that nothing in the Whistleblower Act “restricts plaintiffs from seeking
non-economic or other special damages.” 2012 WL 4522728 at *1 (D. Idaho Oct. 1,
2012). While not binding, Eller respectfully submits that the analysis in Brown is
persuasive and instructive.
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The defendant in Brown made the same argument lodged by ISP in this case
(R., pp. 1732-39): that the enumerated items in section 6-2106 prevent the recovery
of any other damages and specifically emotional distress damages. After recognizing
that all sections of a statute must be considered together and that an interpretation
of a statute must not render a part of it a nullity, the Brown court looked at the two
sections “together, in context,” and “ultimately [gave] effect to both – not just
section 6-2106.” Id. at *2. Brown found it salient, particularly when comparing
Idaho’s statute to other states’ whistleblower statutes, that Idaho had a “remedy”
section (section 6-2105) and a “relief” section (section 6-2106). Id. at *3. Brown
found the relief section expanded what a court could order in addition to traditional
remedies available to the injured employee, such as emotional distress damages. Id.
at *2-3. The court further noted that “if the Idaho legislature wanted to restrict
whistleblower plaintiffs to the remedies listed in section 6-2106, it would have said
exactly that.” Id. at *3. By reading the two sections together, the Brown court was
able to interpret the Act in a manner that did not render section 6-2105 void or
superfluous, upholding the Legislature’s intent to provide actual damages to
whistleblowers. This Court should do the same here, as opposed to applying section
6-2106 as the exclusive relief and remedies available to an employee, which renders
the use of “actual damages” and “injury” in section 6-2105 meaningless.
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3. This Court’s Opinion in Wright does not compel, nor support, the District
Court’s decision.
The District Court below concluded that in the Wright case “the Supreme
Court strictly construed the statutory language to mean that judgments under
the [Whistleblower Act] may only include damages listed in Idaho Code section 62106.” R., p. 1833. Eller respectfully disagrees that Wright incorporated such a
holding, and in fact, submits that this Court in Wright rejected the idea that
section 6-2106 contains any “limiting language.” 160 Idaho at 501, 376 P.3d at 68
In Wright, the district court had dismissed the plaintiff’s whistleblower
and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against Ada County on
summary judgment. 160 Idaho at 494-95, 376 P.3d at 61-62. This Court held,
contrary to Ada County’s arguments, that section 6-2106 did not preclude a
whistleblower from “bringing an independent cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.” 160 Idaho at 501, 376 P.3d at 68. In doing so,
this Court simply said: “Idaho Code section 6-2106 lists the relief available for

judgments under the chapter; it does nothing to limit the relief available under
other, independent causes of action.” 160 Idaho at 501-02, 376 P.3d at 68-69
(emphasis in original). The District Court in this case interpreted this language
to mean that section 6-2106 was the exclusive source of relief and remedies for
claims under the Whistleblower Act. R., pp. 133-34. Importantly, this Court
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explicitly rejected Ada County’s position that “the Whistleblower Act was not
intended to prevent negligent infliction of emotional distress . . .,” 160 Idaho at
501, 376 P.3d at 68, by pointing to section 6-2105(2), which “provides that ‘an
employee who alleged violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for
appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both.’” Id. (quoting I.C. § 62105(2) (emphasis in original)). This Court next quoted section 6-2105’s
definition of damages “as ‘damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of

this chapter...’” Id. (quoting I.C. § 6-2105(1) (emphasis in original)). When
turning to section 6-2106, this Court also emphasized its use of the word “may”
regarding relief that a “court may order.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Thus, while this Court in Wright did not directly address whether a
whistleblower is entitled to actual damages for emotional injury under the Act, it
clearly relied upon language in both sections 6-2105 and 6-2106 in holding “that
a plaintiff may pursue a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress even
if the alleged conduct would also constitute a statutory violation pursuant to the
Whistleblower Act.” 160 Idaho at 502, 376 P.3d at 69. Wright is therefore an
example of this Court construing sections 6-2105 and 6-2106 together, and
refusing to draft non-existent limiting language into section 6-2106.
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D.

The District Court Should not have Reduced the Jury’s Verdict Awarding
Eller Emotional Distress Damages by $500,000.
In its Answer to Eller’s Amended Complaint, ISP raised various affirmative

defenses including its Thirteenth Defense which read: “Plaintiff’s claim for
damages, if any, is limited by Idaho Code §§ 6-1603, 6-1604, 6-1606 and/or 6-2105.”
R., p. 388. Thus, Eller proposed specific jury instructions and a verdict form so that
the Jury would be properly instructed to address ISP’s affirmative defense of the
limitation on noneconomic damages found under section 6-1603 (i.e., whether ISP’s
actions were “willful or reckless misconduct,” I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a)). R., pp. 1708, 1714,
1716. Specifically, the Special Verdict Form asked the Jury if the conduct of ISP
was willful or reckless as defined in the instructions. R., p. 1829 (Question No. 5).
The Jury’s answered that question “yes.” ISP did not move for remittitur. Id.
Instead, on September 7, 2017, ISP filed a Motion for Reduction Pursuant to

I.C. § 6-926. R., pp. 1838-46. This was the first time ISP raised this provision or
otherwise asserted that its caps were at issue in this case. After briefing and oral
argument by the parties, the District Court made several relevant determinations
addressed separately below. The ultimate effect of the District Court’s ruling, as set
forth in a Memorandum Decision and Order, was to reduce the Jury’s verdict for
Eller’s emotional injuries by $500,000. R., pp. 1994, 1997. As set forth below, this
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decision should either be reversed in favor of restoring the Jury’s verdict or, in the
alternative, vacated and remanded to the District Court for further consideration.

1. The District Court correctly interpreted the meaning of “occurrence”
in section 6-926 to equate to an adverse action as alleged in Eller’s
whistleblower case.
Section 6-926 is part of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and reads in
relevant part:
6-926. JUDGMENT OR CLAIMS IN EXCESS OF COMPREHENSIVE
LIABILITY PLAN — REDUCTION BY COURT — LIMITS OF
LIABILITY. (1) The combined, aggregate liability of a
governmental entity and its employees for damages, costs
and attorney’s fees under this chapter, on account of
bodily or personal injury, death or property damage, or
other loss as the result of any one (1) occurrence or
accident regardless of the number of persons injured or
the number of claimants, shall not exceed and is limited
to five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), unless the
governmental entity has purchased applicable, valid,
collectible liability insurance coverage in excess of said
limit, in which event the controlling limit shall be the
remaining available proceeds of such insurance…. If any
judgment or judgments, including costs and attorney’s fees
that may be awarded, are returned or entered, and in the
aggregate total more than five hundred thousand dollars
($500,000), or the limits provided by said valid,
collectible liability insurance, if any, whether in one
(1) or more cases, the court shall reduce the amount of
the award or awards, verdict or verdicts, or judgment or
judgments in any case or cases within its jurisdiction so
as to reduce said aggregate loss to said applicable
statutory limit or to the limit or limits provided by said
valid, collectible insurance, if any, whichever is
greater.

I.C. § 6-926 (emphasis added). No Idaho appellate court has interpreted the
meaning of “occurrence” as used in this statute, leaving this Court to engage in
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statutory interpretation. This analysis begins with the literal words, giving them
“their plain, usual and ordinary meaning.” Wright, 160 Idaho at 497, 376 P.3d at 64.
The District Court appropriately turned to Black’s Law Dictionary for a
definition of occurrence, since such definition was absent in the ITCA. R., p. 1990.
The definition of occurrence is “[s]omething that happens or takes place;
specif[cally], an accident or event, or continuing condition that results in personal

injury or property damage that is neither expected or intended from the standpoint
of an insured.” Id. (emphasis added by the District Court).
In most cases brought under the ITCA, there will be little confusion about
what constitutes an occurrence. Typically, there will unquestionably only be one
(e.g., a malpractice action, a car crash, a police shooting). In whistleblower actions,
as the District Court correctly determined, an injury occurs only when: (1) the
employee engaged/intended to engage in protected activity; (2) the employer took an
adverse action against employee; and (3) there is a causal connection between the
protected activity and adverse action. R., p. 1990 (citing Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr.,
147 Idaho 552, 558, 212 P.3d 982, 988 (2009)). Thus, in the majority of
whistleblower cases, an injury occurs when an employee is fired because s/he
engaged in protective activity (i.e., a single occurrence). However, in this particular
case, Eller presented evidence about multiple adverse actions taken against him as
a result of his protected activity including:
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•

negatively evaluating his performance

•

changing his work duties and hours by disbanding the CRU

•

denying him pay increases

•

refusing to allow him to continue to perform crash-related trainings

•

forcing him out of performing crash reconstruction investigations

•

passing him over for a promotion to a Sergeant position, and

•

straying from the normal promotional procedures used at ISP.

R., pp. 1990-91. 10
These retaliatory actions against Eller breached ISP’s duties under the
Whistleblower Act, and consequently caused him emotional injuries supporting his
NIED claim. Thus, as determined by the District Court, in Eller’s case there were
multiple adverse actions constituting separate “occurrences” for purposes of section
6-926. R., p. 1991-92. The District Court rejected ISP’s argument that the adverse
actions constituted a single “occurrence” just “because they shared a common
catalyst in the Sloan investigation.” 11 R., p. 1992. Instead the Court correctly found
that “[e]ach alleged adverse action would have required a discrete decision and act,
often by different people” within ISP; “there is no evidence that any were inevitable

10 Tr., pp. 929-34; Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 72-77, 379-82, 387-90, 409-17, 418-29, 434-36, 438-44, 457-58;
Pltf. Ex. 18.
11 The court also pointed out that there were two independent protected activities – the Sloan
preliminary hearing testimony (April 2012) and the later objections to the ISP directive to destroy
the peer review report drafts (July 2013). R., pp. 1990, 1992, 1994.
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simply because the others had preceded them.” Id. Thus, the District Court
concluded that “[e]ach adverse action could have established a separate breach of
duty independent from the others.” Id. The District Court’s determination is further
supported by the following additional factors.
First, ISP itself proposed a jury instruction (No. 15) wherein it agreed that
Eller was asserting at least four (4) separate adverse actions under the Act: denying
his pay raise; refusing to use him as a crash instructor; failure to promote to the
Sergeant position; and straying from normal promotional procedures. R., p. 1546.
Likewise, during closing argument, counsel for ISP again noted these four adverse
actions falling within Eller’s whistleblower claim. Tr., p. 1505, L. 4-19 (“Those are
the only four adverse actions under the Whistleblower claim in this case.”)
Second, as recognized by the District Court, the whistleblower adverse
actions occurred during different time frames and involved different decision
makers. R., p. 1992. For example, the denial of Eller’s pay increase occurred in July
of 2014 and involved command staff at headquarters such as Maj. Richardson and
Cpt. Kelley. Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 208-09. Then, in March of 2016, over a year -after
- - - Eller
filed his lawsuit, he applied for a promotion to a Sergeant position. Although Eller
passed the initial testing, passed his panel interview, and got a perfect score during
his one-on-one interview, ISP stopped evaluating Eller’s candidacy through the
remaining steps of the process. He never received a final score/ranking. As such
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Eller was not considered for the promotion. Tr., pp. 781-82, 785-90, 842, 1164.
Additionally, instead of maintaining a roster of qualified individuals to fill other
open positions within the following six (6) month period as represented by ISP in
the announcement, ISP used a new announcement to fill a sergeant opening in
Eller’s district within days of the six (6) month window. Tr., p. 778, 839-40, 1118-20.
Decisions during the promotional process were made, at least in part, by different
command staff such as William Reese, Lt. Doty and Human Resource personnel.
Tr., pp. 1128, 1171-76.
Moreover, there were numerous earlier adverse actions falling within the
NIED statute of limitations. These included, but were not limited to:
•

In 2013, Eller’s supervisor was instructed to downgrade his
performance evaluation, and Lt. Doty called Eller a disgruntled
employee.

•

The December 2013 removal of Eller from his CRU position, which he
had held since 2004, to place him back on a patrol team. This adverse
action changed his work schedule from a regular dayshift to a rotating
shift, where Eller would work swing and night shifts.

•

In January 2014, Eller was relieved as the interim statewide crash
reconstruction program manager, and his duties in that role were
reassigned to two other reconstructionists.
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All of the above had an enormous negative impact on Eller’s professional
reputation and career path at ISP. 12 The District Court correctly determined that it
“cannot conclude that each of these actions combined should be considered one
‘occurrence.’” R., p. 1992.

2. Under Idaho Rule Of Civil Procedure 8(c), damage caps are waived if not
timely raised.
The District Court erred in at least two ways by holding that ISP did not
waive the damage caps contained in section 6-926. First, it erred in holding that
damages caps are not an avoidance or affirmative defense under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(c); second, it erred in holding that the limitations in section 6-926
cannot be waived. R., p. 1987. Both of these legal determinations are subject to free
review by this Court. Ashton Urban Renewal Agency, 155 Idaho at 311, 311 p. 3d at
732.

a. Section 6-926 is an avoidance or affirmative defense under Rule 8(c).
As recognized by the District Court, Rule 8(c) requires a party to set forth any
matter “constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” in its responsive pleading.
R., p. 1984. Though damages caps are not specifically mentioned, the rule’s list of
avoidances and affirmative defenses is not exhaustive, as Rule 8(c) contains a
residual clause. Id. Respectfully, the misstep the District Court made below was in

Tr., pp. 929-34; Tr. 08.17.17, pp. 72-77, 379-82, 387-90, 409-17, 418-29, 434-36, 438-44, 457-58;
Pltf. Ex. 18.

12

APPELLANT ELLER’S OPENING BRIEF - 33

the interpretation of “avoidance.” Neither the parties nor the District Court could
find Idaho authority interpreting what constitutes an “avoidance” and specifically
whether damage caps, like section 6-926, are considered the same. Thus, the
District Court used the definition of avoidance in Black’s Law Dictionary 13: “[t]he
act of evading or escaping,” but then unnecessarily added “liability” to the end of the
definition. 14 R., p. 1985. The District Court went on to incorrectly hold that the cap
in section 6-926 is not an avoidance because it does not allow a defendant to totally
escape liability. Id. However, section 6-926, allows defendants to avoid, i.e., evade or
escape, the Jury’s verdict regarding damages and is certainly a partial avoidance of
their full liability. Thus, when giving the term “avoidance’ its plain meaning,
section 6-926 falls under Rule 8(c)’s residual clause. 15
Further, the error in the District Court’s requirement, that avoidances or
affirmative defenses must cut off total liability, is made clear by considering other

13

Black’s Law Dictionary 163 (10th ed. 2014).
Even with the addition of “liability,” it should not change the results here. Liability is defined in
Black’s Law Dictionary as “[t]he quality, state or condition of being legally obligated or accountable.”
Id. 1053 (10th ed. 2014). Thus, section 6-926 is an avoidance keeping ISP from “being legally
obligated” to pay the full amount of the Jury’s verdict. In other words, “liability” can also mean
liability for damages.
15 The same analysis is equally applicable to the term “affirmative defense” which the District Court
held is applicable only to “the claim at issue, not to the potential recovery.” R., p. 1983 (emphasis in
original). The court relied on Fuhriman v. State Dept. of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 803, 153 P.3d 480,
483 (2007), to support this conclusion. R., pp. 1984-85. Yet, in Fuhriman, this Court simply found
that an affirmative defense is “a defendant’s assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if true,
will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true.” Id.
at 803, 483 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 186 (2d Pocket ed. 2001)). Fuhriman dealt with statutory
employer immunity, which this Court found was an affirmative defense. Fuhriman did not analyze
liability for damages. Id.
14
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affirmative defenses such as comparative negligence or statutes of limitations.
Comparative negligence is expressly required to be pleaded under Rule 8(c), and
like the damage cap in section 6-926, comparative negligence may only be a partial
defense that operates to reduce plaintiff’s damages under Idaho’s “modified”
comparative negligence scheme. See I.C. § 6-801. Likewise, the statute of
limitations is another enumerated affirmative defense/avoidance under the rule and
may operate to cut off damages while not totally cutting off liability. Thus, it cannot
hold true that to qualify as an appropriate avoidance or defense under Rule 8(c), the
same must be a complete bar of all liability.
Finally, while no Idaho appellate court has addressed the issue of whether
the damage caps in section 6-926 are an affirmative defense/avoidance, many other
jurisdictions have held that damages caps must be pled as affirmative
defenses/avoidances. For example, in Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. International

Fabricare Inst., the federal district court held that the Maryland Tort Claims Act
limiting liability of local governments to “$500,000 per total claims that arise from
the same occurrence” constituted an avoidance under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(c). 16 846 F.Supp. 439, 440-41 (D. Md. 1993)(quoting Maryland Code § 5-

Idaho’s Rule 8(c) is nearly identical to the federal rule’s language (except for adding “discharge in
bankruptcy” as another listed affirmative defense/avoidance). When a state and federal rule are
“identical in all material respects . . . [this Court] will look to rulings on the scope of the federal rule
for additional [guidance] in interpreting the Idaho rule." Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 376 n.3,
987 P.2d 284, 288 n.3 (1999).
16
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403(a)). The holding in Westfarm is particularly compelling because of its factual
similarities to this case.
In Westfarm, the government defendant did not raise the cap until after the
jury returned a $2.5 million verdict. Id. at 440. The court determined that the cap
was an avoidance and referenced several like holdings from federal circuit courts.

Id. (citing Jakobsen v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 520 F.2d 810, 813 (1st Cir. 1975))
(Massachusetts port authority tort cap is an affirmative defense because it serves as
a “bar to the right of recovery even if the general complaint were more or less
admitted to”); Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Texas statutory cap on medical malpractice recovery must be pled as an
affirmative defense in federal tort claims act case because “[c]entral to requiring the
pleading of affirmative defenses is the prevention of unfair surprise”); and Simon v.

United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th Cir. 1990) (Louisiana malpractice cap is “an
affirmative defense because it is an ‘avoidance’ within the meaning of Rule 8(c)” in a
federal tort claim act case). The Westfarm court also found it compelling that the
applicability of the cap at issue in that case “would require the resolution of
numerous factual issues related to the damages” including the damage to each of
the six separate parcels. 846 F.Supp. at 441.
Here, ISP was clearly on notice that Eller was asserting multiple adverse
actions. In fact, ISP itself took the position that there were four adverse actions
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under the Whistleblower claim, and at least several more adverse actions as part of
Eller’ s NIED claim. See Tr., p. 1505, L. 4-23 (defense counsel identifying at least
seven (7) adverse actions). Because section 6-926’s cap applies per occurrence, there
were factual issues related to the damages, as in Westfarm. While Eller does not
contend that he was prohibited from presenting evidence related to the multiple
occurrences and his damages arising therefrom, the Jury was not asked to make
that specific determination on the number of adverse actions since ISP did not raise
the issue until after the Jury returned its verdict in Eller’s favor. For all the above
reasons, this Court should hold that section 6-926 is an avoidance/defense under
Rule 8(c).
As referenced above, the Fifth and First Circuits have held similar damage
caps to be waivable affirmative defenses/avoidances. The Tenth Circuit has also
followed suit. See, e.g., Bentley v. Cleveland Cty. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs, 41 F.3d 600,
604-05 (10th Cir. 1994)(holding Oklahoma’s governmental tort claim act cap per
occurrence was an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional matter, and hence had
been waived); Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P’ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1166
(10th Cir. 2017) (Oklahoma state damage cap “operates as an affirmative defense,
placing the burden on defendants to assert it”); See also, Sanderson-Cruz v. United

APPELLANT ELLER’S OPENING BRIEF - 37

States., 88 F.Supp.2d 388, 390-91 (E.D. Penn. 2000) (finding Pennsylvania’s motor
vehicle caps an avoidance in a federal tort claim act case). 17

b. The mandatory language in section 6-926 does not impact its waivability.
The District Court also relied upon what it called “strong mandatory
language” 18 in section 6-926 to be indicative of non-waivability. R., p. 1994. This
rationale fails for at least two reasons.
First, other seemingly mandatory limitations are waivable. For example,
Rule 8(c) lists statute of limitations as an affirmative defense/avoidance. I.R.C.P.
8(c)(1)(Q). Yet, many statutes of limitations contain similar mandatory language.
Specifically, the statute of limitations under the ITCA, says, “[e]very claim against a
governmental entity . . . shall be forever barred, unless an action is begun within
two (2) years after the date the claim arose...” See I.C. § 6-911 (emphasis added).
But see Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1987), where the Ninth Circuit
refused to find that a California damage cap was an affirmative defense (albeit recognizing that its
holding was contrary to a California court of appeals case). However, the Ninth Circuit in Taylor
made its holding with an important caveat – one applicable here. In holding that the cap did not
raise waiver concerns, it noted that the application of the cap did not involve any factual issues and
that plaintiff had not been prejudiced by the lack of notice. Thus, Taylor left open the door for a
successful waiver argument when, like here, the cap at issue requires resolution of factual issues or
would affect the evidence to be adduced at trial. Here, had ISP raised the damage cap before trial,
Eller would have had the opportunity to add an additional question to the Special Verdict form
asking about the number of occurrences for which damages were awarded. Instead, however, Eller’s
substantial rights were prejudiced by ISP’s intentional failure to raise the damages cap during any
pre-trial or trial litigation. This is exactly the circumstance which would mandate an exception to the
holding in Taylor.
18
Although it is not clear what language the District Court was specifically referring to, earlier in
the Decision, the court referenced the language under 6-926(4) stating, “[i]n no case shall any court
enter judgment, or allow any judgment to stand, which results in the limited of liability provided in
this section to be exceeded in any manner or respect.” R., p. 1985 (emphasis added by Court).
17
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Second, the ITCA is itself a creature of waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity.

See Van, 147 Idaho at 557, 212 P.3d at 987 (“[t]he Act abrogates sovereign
immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its
negligent acts or omissions.”). Further, this Court has held that ITCA’s notice
requirements are “procedural, not jurisdictional.” Alpine Village Co. v. City of

McCall, 154 Idaho 930, 936, 303 P.3d 617, 623 (2013). 19 Given the above, there is no
legal support that the damage cap provision under the ITCA is jurisdictional or
unwaivable under the circumstances presented in this case. Thus, the District
Court erred in determining that the section 6-926 is not waivable.

c. ISP waived the right to assert the caps under section 6-926.
Based on the above, the District Court’s misinterpretation that section 6926’s damage cap is not required to be pleaded (or raised prior to the verdict) is
plainly in error and should be reversed. Failure to timely raise an affirmative
defense or avoidance results in its waiver. Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d
820, 823 (2000). “The purpose of the rule requiring these defenses to be pleaded is to
alert the parties concerning the issues of fact which will be tried and to afford them
an opportunity to present evidence to meet those defenses.” Williams v. Paxton, 98
Idaho 155, 163 n. 1, 559 P.2d 1123, 1131 n.1 (1976). As such, an avoidance must be
19 In so holding, this Court relied on Article 5, section 20 of the Idaho Constitution which provided
the courts with “original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity” and this Court’s
presumption of subject matter jurisdiction absent a showing otherwise. 154 Idaho at 936, 303 P.3d at
623.
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raised before trial such that “the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and
oral argument.” Krinitt v. Idaho Dep’t of Fish and Game, 162 Idaho 425, 429, 398
P.3d 158, 162 (2017) (quoting Patterson v. State Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 151
Idaho 310, 316, 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011)). Here, it is undisputed that ISP failed to
raise section 6-926 until after the Jury rendered its verdict and was excused from
service. R., pp. 1838-46. Thus, this Court should find that ISP waived its right to
assert section 6-926’s damage caps in this case, and restore the Jury’s verdict.

3. In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the District Court to
make appropriate findings of fact pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 49(a)(3).
The District Court’s Order regarding ISP’s request for reduction attempted to
avoid disturbing the Jury’s findings. The District Court likely did so out of respect
for Idaho’s long recognition that “a right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”
IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 7. This includes the “right of the jury to assess and award
general or noneconomic damages to plaintiff in personal injury cases.” Kirkland,
134 Idaho at 467, 2 P.3d at 1118. Further, this Court has made clear that “it is not
the trial court’s prerogative to disregard or nullify [the jury’s findings] by making
finding of [its] own.” Ross, 114 Idaho at 826, 761 P.2d at 1178. Indeed, a court
overruling a jury’s verdict may deny a party’s right to jury trial. Id.
Here, because ISP failed to raise the issue until post-verdict, the District
Court faced this question: “how many occurrences the jury found and factored into
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its decision to award Plaintiff $1,500,000 in damages on his NIED claim.” R., p.
1993. The District Court answered saying, “the Court can easily determine that the
jury found at least two adverse actions . . . the loss of the Choice Point pay increase
and Sergeant promotion” for which the Jury gave the full amount of economic losses
requested by Eller. Id. The District Court then went on to say that although it
could not determine how many total occurrences the Jury found, the Court believed
that “[i]n light of the totality of the evidence present at trial, the Court is confident
that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant took more than two
adverse actions against Plaintiff.” R., p. 1993, n. 5 (emphasis added). In fact, the
District Court said that “one could rationally conclude that the jury based the NIED
award on more than the two adverse actions” when it awarded economic damages
for under the Whistleblower Act (denial of the pay increase and denial of the
promotion). Id. (emphasis added).
Despite this clear indication of what the Court would find, the District Court
said that it “is not aware of any legal basis under which it had the authority to
make such finding in order to construe the jury’s verdict.” R., p. 1993. This then is
where the District Court erred. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a)(3), when
the pleadings or evidence in a case raise an issue of fact, but the issue was not
submitted to the jury, the judge is empowered to make a finding on the issue. In
relevant part, Rule 49(a)(3) provides:
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Issues Not Submitted. A party waives the right to a jury trial on any

issue of fact raised by the pleading or evidence but not submitted to
the jury unless, before the jury retires, the party demands its
submission to the jury. If the party does not demand submission, the
court may make a finding on the issue.
I.R.C.P. 49(a)(3) (emphasis added). Questions of compliance with the rules of
procedure are questions of law, such that this Court exercises free review. Black

Canyon Irrigation District, 163 Idaho at 149, 408 P.3d at 904. 20
The authority of a judge to make a finding on an issue of fact not submitted
to the jury under Rule 49 applies even when those facts are essential to a party’s
claim. Milligan v. Continental Life & Accident Co., 91 Idaho 191, 196-97, 418 P.2d
554, 559-60 (1966). In Milligan, an insurance company appealed the denial of its
motion for j.n.o.v., arguing the respondents had a duty to inform the company of any
material change in health during the period after applying for the policy, but before
the policy became effective. 91 Idaho at 194, 418 P.2d at 557. Though each party
had submitted evidence on whether there was a change in health during the
relevant period, the question was not submitted to the jury. 91 Idaho at 196, 418
P.2d at 559. Instead, the jury had only been asked to determine whether
misrepresentations were made on the application. Id. The trial court, after the jury
20 Even if this error was reviewed for abuse of discretion, vacating and remanding is appropriate. As
recently articulated by this Court in Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 867, 421 P3d 187,
198 (2018), the first step of discretionary review is that the court “[c]orrectly perceived the issue as
one of discretion.” Here, the District Court specifically noted that it was “not aware of any legal basis
under which it had the authority to make such finding in order to construe the jury’s verdict.” R., p.
1993. As such, the Court admittedly failed to perceive its discretion.
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returned a verdict, determined the issue itself, finding the evidence had not
established a change of health. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
denial of the company’s motion because no demand had been made that the issue be
submitted to the jury. Therefore, it was within the trial court’s discretion to make
the finding under Rule 49(a). 91 Idaho at 196-97, 418 P.2d at 559-560.
Here, the District Court was unsure of its authority to make additional
findings not submitted to the Jury and thus, although the District Court specified
what it would likely find, it ultimately felt compelled to enter a judgment upon a
finding of “at least two” occurrences. R., p. 1993. Thus, if this Court determines that
ISP did not waive the cap under section 6-926, then the District Court’s Decision
reducing the jury verdict by $500,000 should be vacated, and the case should be
remanded with direction to the District Court to make a finding about the number
of occurrences pursuant to Rule 49(a). 21 Permitting the District Court’s failure to
apply Rule 49(a) under these circumstances, albeit unintentional, would lead to an
unconstitutional overruling of the Jury’s verdict.

E.

Eller is Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees for this Appeal.
The Whistleblower Act provides that a court may order “payment by the

employer of reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees” to the employee. I.C. § 6-2106(5).

See Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, 163 Idaho 874, 888, 421 P.3d 205, 219 (2018)(because
the district court failed to make sufficient findings and thus failed to act consistently with relevant
legal standards, the case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings).
21
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Likewise, section 6-2105’s remedies include “court costs and reasonable attorneys’
fees.” I.C. § 6-2105(1). See also Wright, 160 Idaho at 502, 376 P.2d at 69 (permitting
an award of reasonable costs and fees on appeal if Wright prevailed on his
Whistleblower Act claim on remand). As such, Eller should be awarded his costs
and attorney fees incurred on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant/Plaintiff Brandon Eller
respectfully requests the following:
1. This Court reverse the District Court’s decision that whistleblowers are
precluded from seeking emotional distress damages under the Whistleblower Act
and remand the case with instruction to reinstate the Jury’s full verdict regarding
emotional distress damages.
2. This Court reverse the District Court’s decision that ISP did not waive
section 6-926’s cap and remand the case with instruction to reinstate the Jury’s full
verdict regarding emotional distress damages.
3. In the alternative to the above, this Court remand the case back to the
District Court with instruction to consider the evidence presented at trial in order
to make a finding regarding the number of adverse actions pursuant to Rule 49(a)
and construe the Jury’s verdict consistent therewith.
4. Eller be awarded his reasonable fees and costs on appeal.
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DATED this ___ day of August, 2018.

By:______________________________
Erika Birch
T. Guy Hallam
STRINDBERG & SCHOLNICK, LLC
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff

APPELLANT ELLER’S OPENING BRIEF - 45

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3l

I hereby certify that on this ___ day of August, 2018, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document was served on the following via the iCourt electronic
filing system and electronic mail:
Andrew C. Brassey
Jason Murray
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court
P.O. Box 1009
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Mr. Michael J. Kane
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
Boise, ID 83706
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_______________________________
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ADDENDUM

In Re: Decision on Joint Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Idaho Supreme
Court (Dkt. 31, 32, 45), Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Corizon LLC, 2018 WL 472145, ___
P.3d ___ (2018)

Brown v. City of Caldwell, 2012 WL 4522728 (D. Idaho Oct. 1, 2012)
Garcia v. PSI Envtl. Sys., 2012 WL 2359496 (D. Idaho June 20, 2012)

In Re Decision on Joint Motion to Certify Question of Law to..., --- P.3d ---- (2018)
2018 WL 472145

2018 WL 472145
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, December 2017 Term.

Elam & Burke, Boise, for respondent. John J. Burke
argued.
Opinion
BURDICK, Chief Justice.

IN RE: DECISION ON JOINT MOTION
TO CERTIFY QUESTION OF LAW TO
the IDAHO SUPREME COURT (DKT.
31, 32, 45) and Order of Certification.
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf
Medical Center, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Corizon LLC, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No. 45187
|
Filed: January 17, 2018
Synopsis
Background: Hospital brought action in federal court
against privatized correctional medical provider with
whom it had contract to provide medical services, alleging
breach of contract, breach of implied contract, unjust
enrichment, and declaratory judgment. Parties filed a joint
motion to certify a question of law. The United States
District Court, District of Idaho, Ronald E. Bush, United
States Magistrate Judge, certified question.

[Holding:] The Supreme Court, Burdick, C.J., held that,
in statute addressing medical costs of state prisoners,
neither “state board of correction” nor “department of
correction” includes privatized medical care providers
under contract with the Idaho Department of Correction.

Question answered.

Certified question of law from the United States District
Court, District of Idaho. Hon. Ronald E. Bush, U.S.
Magistrate Judge.
Certified question of law answered in the negative.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Racine, Olson, Nye. Budge & Bailey, Chtd., Pocatello, for
appellant. Scott J. Smith argued.

*1 This case arrives at the Idaho Supreme Court
as a certified question of law from the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho. The question
certified is “[w]hether, for purposes of the dispute in
this lawsuit, the terms ‘state board of correction’ as
used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(1) and ‘department of
correction’ as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(2), include
privatized correctional medical providers under contract
with the Idaho Department of Correction.” We answer the
question certified in the negative.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[1] When addressing a certified question of law, this
Court will consider “only those facts contained in the
[certification] order.” Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117
Idaho 901, 902 n.1, 792 P.2d 926, 927 n.1 (1990); accord
White v. Valley Cnty., 156 Idaho 77, 78, 320 P.3d 1236,
1237 (2014); St. Luke’s Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr. v.
Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 39, 293 P.3d 661, 663 (2013). Thus,
the following facts to which the parties have stipulated
“are drawn and recited verbatim from the U.S. District
Court’s certification order[.]” White, 156 Idaho at 78, 320
P.3d at 1237.
For a number of years, the Idaho Department of
Correction [ (“IDOC” or “department of correction”) ]
has contracted with Corizon, LLC (“Corizon”), a
private provider of prison healthcare services, to
provide healthcare services to IDOC inmates in custody
and to indemnify IDOC from any claims associated
with those services. The current contract between IDOC
and Corizon began January 1, 2014, and runs through
December 31, 2018 (the “Contract”).
The Contract resulted from a Request for Proposal
(“RFP”) issued by IDOC for healthcare contractors.
The RFP included language that stated IDOC was
pursuing a program that would allow the selected
contractor to realize reduced costs for inmates
hospitalized for over 24 hours. If implemented, the
program was intended to apply Medicaid rates to those
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services provided during the hospital stay. Further, the
per diem rate to be paid under the Contract would be
required to change to a new per diem with Medicaid
rates that the State would specify at that time.
As described in more detail below, IDOC and Corizon
are in disagreement about how much is owed to
Corizon as payment for services that fall under the
hospitalization services. The parties identify these
provisions of their Contract as relevant to their dispute:
1. IDOC agreed to pay a fixed rate per inmate per day;
2. In exchange for this fixed rate, Corizon agreed to
provide comprehensive healthcare to inmates, to
assume “full risk” of all comprehensive healthcare
for inmates, and to “absorb” any and all associated
costs;
3. IDOC will not consider amending the contract to
increase IDOC’s costs unless Corizon establishes
among other things that: (1) the condition
requiring amendment was not reasonably
foreseeable at the time Corizon submitted its
Proposal; and (2) Corizon has made all reasonable
efforts to address the problem at no increased cost
to IDOC;
*2 4. Corizon agreed to provide healthcare services
on-site at prisons to the greatest extent possible and
to develop a network of local medical providers for
necessary medical services not available on-site;
5. Corizon agreed to be responsible for payment
of all medical claims from medical providers, to
have contracts or written agreements with medical
providers in place for both inpatient and outpatient
services, and to negotiate payment rates with those
medical providers;
6. Corizon agreed that its payments to medical
providers would be made within 30 days of
Corizon’s receipt of an invoice from a medical
provider; and
7. Corizon agreed to indemnify IDOC from any
and all claims associated with the provision of
healthcare services to inmates.
Corizon often contracted with local medical providers
for discounted and/or reduced rates on healthcare
services for inmates, including inmates at the Pocatello

Women’s Correctional Center (“PWCC”). One such
contract for PWCC inmates was a “Hospital Services
Agreement” (“HSA”) between Corizon and a local
hospital, Portneuf Medical Center (“PMC”). 1 In that
agreement, PMC was to provide hospitalization and
other inpatient and outpatient-related services and
supplies to inmates at Corizon’s request. PMC agreed
to a discounted rate for those healthcare services, with
Corizon to pay those charges within 30 days from
receipt. PMC was to submit all claims directly to
Corizon and not seek payment from IDOC. Claims not
timely paid accrued interest.
The HSA between Corizon and PMC began on January
1, 2011, prior to the January 1, 2014 effective date
of the current contract between Corizon and IDOC.
Corizon paid the full contract rate under the HSA to
PMC for healthcare services provided from January 1,
2011, through June 30, 2014. The dispute in this case
stems from the fact that the HSA rate is greater than the
Medicaid reimbursement rate.
On March 18, 2014, Corizon sent a letter to IDOC
which stated the following:
Corizon is requesting a formal contract amendment
consistent with the program outlined in [Corizon’s
Request for Proposal] and within the scope of Idaho
Code § 20-237B. Corizon will provide notification
to hospitals that Corizon will pay for inpatient
services rendered after July 1, 2014 at the Medicaid
reimbursement rate ... [.]
This amendment will reduce the current per diem rate
by $0.65 as outlined in [the Cost Proposal Form]. This
item is per diem cost per offender per day as Per Diem
1 with Medicaid Rates based on 7100 inmates which
includes Idaho Correctional Center (ICC).
This will reduce the per diem of $15.31 to $14.66
starting on July 1, 2014 ... [.]
IDOC accepted Corizon’s proposal.
Corizon claims to have sent a letter to PMC in May
of 2014, stating that as of July 1, 2014, any contract
rate set out in the HSA would be superseded by the
statutory reimbursement rate set forth in Idaho Code
§ 20-237B. PMC says it never received such a letter.
Regardless, as of July 1, 2014, Corizon has paid PMC
at the Medicaid reimbursement rate identified in the
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statute. PMC objected to the reduction in payment,
contending that it should be paid at the higher contract
rate set out in the HSA.
On September 29, 2015, Corizon gave written notice
to PMC exercising its option to terminate the HSA
without cause. Since January 1, 2016, there is no
contractual agreement between Corizon and PMC as
to payment for medical care rendered to prisoners.
Prisoners have continued to receive medical care from
PMC. However, since January 1, 2016, Corizon has
paid PMC at the Idaho Medicaid reimbursement rate
provided in I.C. § 20-237B. Corizon contends that this
rate is required by the IDOC and state law, and that
PMC must accept payment at this rate. PMC contends
that payment amounts made by Corizon to PMC for
medical care rendered to prisoners are not limited to
the Idaho Medicaid reimbursement rate set out in §
20-237B.

Correction inmates within Corizon’s
care, absent a binding contract?
On June 30, 2017, the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho granted the parties’ joint certification
motion and reframed the question as “[w]hether, for
purposes of the dispute in this lawsuit, the terms ‘state
board of correction’ as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(1)
and ‘department of correction’ as used in Idaho Code
§ 20-237B(2), include privatized correctional medical
providers under contract with the Idaho Department of
Correction.” 5 On August 10, 2017, this Court accepted
the certified question and designated PMC as Appellant
and Corizon as Respondent. On November 16, 2017, this
Court granted IDOC’s application for leave to file a brief
as amicus curiae in support of Corizon.

II. CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW

*3 ....
As a result of this dispute, PMC sued Corizon. PMC
raises four claims for relief: (1) a breach of the IDOC
contract; 2 (2) breach of implied contract; (3) unjust
enrichment; and (4) declaratory judgment. PMC seeks
payment of the “usual and customary fees” 3 for the
healthcare services provided to PWCC inmates by
PMC beginning on January 1, 2016, after the contract

1. Whether, for purposes of the dispute in this lawsuit,
the terms “state board of correction” as used in Idaho
Code § 20-237B(1) and “department of correction” as
used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(2), include privatized
correctional medical providers under contract with the
Idaho Department of Correction.

between PMC and Corizon was terminated. 4
The parties believe that their dispute turns upon
the interpretation of Idaho law which has not been
previously considered by the Idaho Supreme Court.
(internal citations omitted).
The parties filed a joint motion to certify a question of
law to this Court on February 17, 2017, and framed the
question as follows:
Is PMC required to accept
an amount no greater than
the reimbursement rate applicable
based on the Idaho Medicaid
reimbursement rate consistent with
Idaho Code § 20-237B from Corizon
as full and reasonable payment
for medical treatment provided by
PMC to Idaho Department of

III. ANALYSIS
[2]

[3]

Courts of the United States may certify a controlling
question of law in a pending action to the
Idaho Supreme Court where there is no controlling
precedent in Idaho Supreme Court decisions and the
determination would materially advance the orderly
resolution of the litigation in the United States court.
The Court’s role “is limited to answering the certified
question” when the question presented is narrow.
*4 Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 159 Idaho 103, 105, 356
P.3d 1049, 1051 (2015) (citations omitted).
Raised for this Court’s interpretation is Idaho Code
section 20-237B, which provides:
(1) The state board of correction shall pay to a provider
of a medical service for any and all prisoners, committed
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to the custody of the department of correction,
confined in a correctional facility, as defined in
section 18-101A(1), Idaho Code, an amount no greater
than the reimbursement rate applicable based on the
Idaho medicaid reimbursement rate. This limitation
applies to all medical care services provided outside
the facility, including hospitalizations, professional
services, durable and nondurable goods, prescription
drugs and medications provided to any and all prisoners
confined in a correctional facility, as defined in section
18-101A(1), Idaho Code. For required services that
are not included in the Idaho medicaid reimbursement
schedule, the state board of correction shall pay the
reasonable value of such service.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, the
term “provider of a medical service” shall include only
companies, professional associations and other health
care service entities whose services are billed directly to
the department of correction. The term “provider of a
medical service” shall exclude:
(a) Privatized correctional medical providers under
contract with the department of correction to
provide health care to prison inmates;
(b) Private prison companies;
(c) Out-of-state correctional facilities contracting
with the department of correction to house
prisoners;

establish what they mean where they appear in that same
act.’ ” Id. (quoting Maguire v. Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 836,
590 P.2d 85, 92 (1978)). If statutory interpretation involves
more than just statutorily-defined terms,
[t]he statute is viewed as a whole,
and the analysis begins with the
language of the statute, which
is given its plain, usual and
ordinary meaning. In determining
the ordinary meaning of the statute,
effect must be given to all the words
of the statute if possible, so that
none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant. However, if the language
of the statute is capable of more
than one reasonable construction it
is ambiguous, and a statute that
is ambiguous must be construed
with legislative intent in mind,
which is ascertained by examining
not only the literal words of the
statute, but the reasonableness of the
proposed interpretations, the policy
behind the statute, and its legislative
history.
*5 Taylor v. AIA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 561–62,
261 P.3d 829, 838–39 (2011) (quoting BHC Intermountain
Hosp., Inc. v. Ada Cnty., 150 Idaho 93, 95, 244 P.3d 237,
239 (2010)).

(d) County jails; and
[9] The question certified here raises two primary
inquiries. The first is whether the “ ‘state board of
correction’ as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(1) ...
include[s] privatized correctional medical care providers
under contract with [IDOC].” As noted, section
20-237B(1) states that “[t]he state board of correction
shall pay to a provider of a medical service ... an amount
no greater than the reimbursement rate applicable based
[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] “Because the question is one of law,
on the Idaho medicaid reimbursement rate.” The “state
this Court exercises free review.” Harrigfeld v. Hancock,
board of correction” is mandated by article X, section 5 of
140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004). Statutory
the Idaho Constitution, which states:
interpretation that turns on “[l]egislative definitions of
The state legislature shall establish
terms included within a statute” presents a straighta nonpartisan board to be known
forward analysis, as those definitions “control and dictate
as the state board of correction,
the meaning of those terms as used in the statute.” State v.
and to consist of three members
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 477, 163 P.3d 1183, 1189 (2007).
appointed by the governor, one
“Statutory definitions provided in one act do not apply
member for two years, one member
‘for all purposes and in all contexts but generally only
(e) Companies, professional associations and other
health care service entities whose services are
provided within the terms of agreements with
privatized correctional medical providers under
contract with the department of correction, private
prison companies and county jails.
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for four years, and one member for
six years. After the appointment of
the first board the term of each
member appointed shall be six years.
This board shall have the control,
direction and management of the
penitentiaries of the state, their
employees and properties, and of
adult felony probation and parole,
with such compensation, powers,
and duties as may be prescribed by
law.
Under this constitutional command, the Legislature
established the state board of correction and defined it by
statute as
a nonpartisan board of three (3)
members to be known as the state
board of correction, referred to in
this chapter as the board, appointed
by the governor to exercise the
duties imposed by law. The board
shall be the constitutional board
of correction prescribed by section
5, article X, of the constitution
of the state of Idaho. Not more
than two (2) members shall belong
to the same political party. Any
person appointed a member of the
board shall hold office for six (6)
years. Vacancies in the membership
of the board shall be filled in the
same manner in which the original
appointments are made.
I.C. § 20-201A(1). Neither article X, section 5 of the
Idaho Constitution nor section 20-201A(1) say anything
of privatized medical care providers under contract
with IDOC. We thus conclude the “state board of
correction” referenced in section 20-237B(1) does not
include privatized medical care providers under contract
with IDOC.
[10] The second inquiry raised in the question certified is
whether the “ ‘department of correction’ as used in Idaho
Code § 20-237B(2) ... include[s] privatized correctional
medical care providers under contract with [IDOC].” As
noted, section 20-237B(2) clarifies that “the term ‘provider
of a medical service’ shall include only companies,

professional associations and other health care service
entities whose services are billed directly to the department
of correction.” The Legislature created the “department
of correction” by statute, and it “consist[s] of [1] the
board of correction and [2] the commission of pardons
and parole. The department of correction shall, for the
purposes of section 20, article IV, of the constitution of
the state of Idaho, be an executive department of state
government.” I.C. § 20-201. The state board of correction,
as noted previously, is “a nonpartisan board of three (3)
members ... appointed by the governor to exercise the
duties imposed by law.” Id. § 20-201A(1); see also Idaho
Const. art. X, § 5. And the commission of pardons and
parole is “composed of seven (7) members” who “serve
at the pleasure of the governor ....” I.C. § 20-210. In
these statutory provisions, the Legislature said nothing
of privatized medical care providers under contract with
IDOC. Consequently, we conclude the “department of
correction” referenced in section 20-237B(2) does not
include privatized medical care providers under contract
with IDOC.
*6 Section 20-237B as a whole supports our conclusions.
See Taylor, 151 Idaho at 561, 261 P.3d at 838 (explaining
that, when engaging in statutory interpretation, the
“statute is viewed as a whole” (quoting BHC
Intermountain Hosp., 150 Idaho at 95, 244 P.3d at 239)).
Section 20-237B specifically distinguishes governmental
entities—like the “state board of correction” and “the
department of correction”—from a “provider of a medical
service.” By distinguishing among these entities, the
statute is clear in that it prohibits the “state board of
correction” from paying more than the Idaho Medicaid
reimbursement rate to a “provider of a medical service”
whose services are “billed directly to the department of
correction.” I.C. § 20-237B(1)-(2). The ordinary meaning
of “directly” is “without anything intervening.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 460 (6th ed. 1990). Here, however, PMC’s
services are not billed directly to IDOC. To the contrary,
the certification order provides that “PMC was to submit
all claims directly to Corizon and not seek payment
from IDOC.” Nor does the state board of correction
pay PMC for its services, but rather, the certification
order provides that PMC seeks payment from Corizon.
As stated in the certification order, Corizon is a “private
provider of prison healthcare services[.]” While Corizon
and IDOC, as amicus curiae, contend the fact that PMC’s
services are billed directly to Corizon is insignificant since
Corizon just pays PMC on IDOC’s behalf, we decline to
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render the plain and unambiguous statutory requirements
superfluous. See, e.g., Taylor, 151 Idaho at 561, 261 P.3d
at 838 (“[E]ffect must be given to all the words of the
statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous,
or redundant.” (quoting BHC Intermountain Hosp., 150
Idaho at 95, 244 P.3d at 239)).
[11] Where, as here, the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, we must give effect to the Legislature’s
deliberate drafting decisions. For instance, in Safe Air
for Everyone v. Idaho State Department of Agriculture,
145 Idaho 164, 165, 177 P.3d 378, 379 (2008), this
Court addressed whether the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture (ISDA) violated the Idaho Open Meetings
Act (IOMA) when some ISDA employees held a private
meeting with representatives of various agencies and
Indian tribes. The IOMA statute at issue stated “all
meetings of a governing body of a public agency shall
be open to the public.” Id. (quoting I.C. § 67-2342(1)
(2008)). The issue, then, was whether the ISDA employees
constituted a “governing body of a public agency.” Id.
This Court held that they did not, observing that “it
is clear that the legislature distinguished between the
‘governing body’ and the ‘employees’ of an entity.”
Id. at 167, 177 P.3d at 381. Under IOMA, “the
governing body is defined as members of a public
agency, not employees of a public agency.” Id. (citing
I.C. § 67-2341(5) (2008)). And unlike employees, a
“governing body” under IOMA was required to have
“the authority to make decisions for or recommendations
to a public agency regarding any matter.” Id. at 168,
177 P.3d at 382 (quoting I.C. § 67-2341(5) (2008)).
The ISDA employees lacked that authority, as any
“decision they make can be countermanded by a
supervisor, and their supervisor can likewise deny them
permission to make recommendations.” Id. Thus, the
Legislature’s deliberate drafting decision—requiring a
“governing body” as opposed to mere employees—was
dispositive. Id.; accord Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 477–78,
163 P.3d at 1189–90 (2007) (concluding audio recording
of county commissioners’ meeting did not satisfy IOMA’s
requirement for written minutes since the Legislature had
“clearly expressed its intent to require written minutes” by
expressly stating IOMA required “written minutes”).
Corizon’s principal counter-argument is that it can “step
into the shoes of [IDOC] under the law of agency.” In
support, Corizon cites to Idaho Code section 20-241A(1)

(a) and asserts section 20-241A(1)(a) shows that IDOC
“has the power to hire private contractors to provide
for the care and subsistence of its prisoners” and “[s]uch
a contractor acts solely as an agent of the State[.]”
We reject Corizon’s assertion. As Corizon conceded at
oral argument, section 20-241A(1)(a) is irrelevant here. 6
It is titled “[a]greements for confinement of inmates.”
I.C. § 20-241A(1)(a). It covers private entities “receiving
physical custody for the purpose of incarceration” and
provides that those entities “shall be considered as acting
solely as an agent of this state.” Id. Section 20-241A(1)(a)
therefore does not address privatized entities who provide
medical care to prisoners but do not house or retain
physical custody over prisoners. In fact, Corizon’s reliance
on section 20-241A(1)(a) bolsters our conclusions above.
Unlike section 20-241A(1)(a), section 20-237B contains no
language addressing an agency relationship. This Court
will not graft that language into section 20-237B. See, e.g.,
Wright v. Ada Cnty., 160 Idaho 491, 498, 376 P.3d 58, 65
(2016); Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty.,
159 Idaho 84, 89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015); Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265 P.3d
502, 509 (2011).
*7 [12] Given the plain, unambiguous terms of section
20-237B, we answer the question certified in the negative.
We therefore need not reach the arguments concerning
agency deference to IDOC’s construction, if any, of
section 20-237B in Corizon’s favor, as it is settled
that “[a]n agency construction will not be followed if
it contradicts the clear expression of the legislature.”
Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135
Idaho 568, 572, 21 P.3d 890, 894 (2001) (citing Rim View
Trout Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848,
853 (1992)).

IV. CONCLUSION
Question certified is answered in the negative.

Justices JONES, HORTON, BRODY and BEVAN
concur.
All Citations
--- P.3d ----, 2018 WL 472145
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Footnotes

1
2
3
4
5
6

As footnoted in the certification order, “Defendant Pocatello Hospital, LLC, does business as Portneuf Medical Center.”
As footnoted in the certification order, “PMC alleges it [is] a third-party beneficiary of the IDOC Contract.”
As footnoted in the certification order, “[t]he difference in the ‘usual and customary’ fees and what Corizon has paid PMC
was $373,007.04 as of June 27, 2016.”
As footnoted in the certification order, “[t]he parties reached an agreement out of court and PMC dismissed its first cause
of action seeking damages for services from July 1, 2014, to December 31, 2015, when the HSA was still in place.”
The parties did not object below, nor do they object here, to the district court’s reframing of the certified question.
Similarly, in its brief as amicus curiae, IDOC erroneously cites to Idaho Code sections 67-9202 and 67-9205. But these
two code sections are irrelevant. Title 67, Chapter 92 of the Idaho Code is entitled the “State Procurement Act” and
does not address the provision of medical care services to prisoners. Section 67-9202 does not assist IDOC. It declares
as public policies of Idaho to (1) “engage in open, competitive acquisitions of property”; and (2) “maximize the value
received by the state with attendant benefits to the citizens.” I.C. § 67-9202. Neither does section 67-9205 assist IDOC.
Section 67-9205 enumerates a litany of powers and duties of the “administrator.” The “administrator” is defined as “the
administrator of the division of purchasing as created by section 67-9204, Idaho Code.” Id. § 67-9203(2). In turn, section
67-9204 creates “within the department of administration the division of purchasing.” This matter does not involve the
department of administration or the division of purchasing.

End of Document
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United States District Court, D. Idaho.
Douglas A. BROWN, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CALDWELL, a subdivision
of the state of Idaho, Defendant.
No. 1:10–cv–00536–BLW.
|
Oct. 1, 2012.

The Court disagrees. As the City correctly notes, it is not
required to show that Brown's termination was only for
those reasons set forth in the notice. Instead, it only must
show that Brown was not terminated for some unlawful
reason. If the City now claims that it terminated Brown
for reasons not specifically articulated in the notice, it
may present evidence to support those alternative reasons.
Conversely, Brown may argue to the jury that City
officials must be fabricating these new reasons because
they did not list them in the termination notice. This
does not mean, however, that the new reasons would be
inadmissible.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Jason RN Monteleone, Sam Johnson, Johnson &
Monteleone, Boise, ID, for Plaintiff.
Bruce J. Castleton, Eric F. Nelson, Kirtlan G. Naylor,
Naylor and Hales, Boise, ID, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge.
INTRODUCTION
*1 The Court has before it Plaintiff Douglas Brown's
motion in limine (Dkt.61), as well Defendant City of
Caldwell's two motions in limine (Dkts. 63 & 67). 1 The
parties have been able to reach an agreement on many of
these issues. For those issues that remain the Court will
deny both Brown and the City's motions in limine.

ANALYSIS
1. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine
Brown asks the Court to preclude the City “from
introducing, referencing, mentioning, or commenting on
any alleged reason or basis for terminating Plaintiff's
employment other than those identified on the November
18, 2009, Notice of Termination.” Pl.'s Br. at 2. Brown
maintains that the City has identified all the reasons
for terminating Brown in this termination notice, and
therefore evidence of any other reason would be irrelevant
under Federal Rule of Evidence 401.

2. Defendant's Motion in Limine
Brown has stipulated regarding two of the City's motions
in limine: (1) Brown will not mention his own bankruptcy
at trial; and (2) Brown will not refer to the Defendant's
insurer (ICRMP) at trial. In addition, the parties have
already stipulated to removing the officially named
individual parties, and this Court has entered an order
effectuating that stipulation. Thus, the only remaining
issue raised by the City relates to damages under the Idaho
Whistleblower Act.
The City of Caldwell asks the Court to preclude plaintiff
Douglas Brown from introducing evidence of “various
non-economic damages” and special damages allegedly
arising from Brown's whistleblower claim. The City has
indicated some specific evidence it is concerned about
with regard to the special damages, including evidence of
money Brown spent (1) trying to find a job, (2) moving
to Georgia, (3) renting a storage unit in Boise, (4) paying
a bankruptcy attorney, and (5) buying a car, or more
specifically, borrowing money to buy a car. See Mot.
Mem., Dkt. 61–1.
The Court will deny this motion.

A. Idaho's Whistleblower Act
Under Idaho Code Section 6–2105, employees alleging
whistleblower claims may sue for “appropriate injunctive
relief or actual damages, or both, .... “ I.C. § 6–2105(2).
Within this same section, “damages” is defined to include
“damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of
this chapter.” Idaho Code § 6–2105(1). Nothing in this
language restricts plaintiffs from seeking non-economic or
other special damages.
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*2 The City, however, argues that the very next
section of the Whistleblower Act—Idaho Code Section 6–
2106—prevents plaintiffs from recovering non-economic
and other special damages. Section 6–2106 lists specific
things a court “may” order in rendering a judgment
whistleblower claims, including (1) injunctive relief; (2)
reinstatement; (3) compensation for “lost wages, benefits,
and other remuneration”; (4) costs and attorneys' fees; and
(5) civil fines. 2 The City contends that the types of relief
listed here are exclusive and the only types a plaintiff may
seek—notwithstanding the broad definition of damages in
the previous section. The City attempts to avoid Section
6–2105's broad definition of damages by arguing that
Section 6–2106 is a more specific and, therefore, must
prevail over the more general definition of damages set out
in Section 6–2105.
What the City is really doing, however, is asking the Court
to ignore Idaho Code Section 6–2105, while focusing
solely on Section 6–2106. This violates two cardinal
rules of statutory construction. First, “[t]he Court must
construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections
of applicable statutes together to determine the intent
of the legislature.” Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125
Idaho 333, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Idaho 1994) (internal
citation omitted). Second, Courts must “give a statute
an interpretation that will not render it a nullity.” State
v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 807 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Idaho
Ct.App.1991). By allowing plaintiffs to seek recovery
for non-economic and special damages, the Court views
Section 6–2105 and Section 6–2106 together, in context,
and, ultimately gives effect to both—not just Section 6–
2106.
The Court also finds the City's comparison of Idaho's
Whistleblower Act to Florida's unpersuasive. The City
points out that the Florida Whistleblower Act has the
same type of list contained in Section 6–2106—regarding
the types of relief courts “may” order. Compare I.C.
§ 6–2106 with Fla. Stat. § 448.103(2)(a) to (e). But
unlike Idaho's list, which does not say anything about
a plaintiff's ability to recover compensatory damages,
Florida expressly states that a court may order “[a]ny
other compensatory damages allowable at law.” Fla.
Stat. § 448.103(2)(e). The City thus concludes that “the
Florida legislature clearly intended to provide for broader
coverage than is contemplated in Idaho, ....” City Mot.
Mem., Dkt. 61–1, at 6–7.

The Court, however, believe the City's analysis is flawed.
A closer look at the Florida and Idaho Whistleblower Acts
shows that both say essentially the same thing about the
damages a plaintiff may recover in a whistleblower action
—just in different ways.
First, both acts have an “employee-remedy” section and
a “relief” section. The remedy section says employees can
sue for violations of the whistleblower act, and it also say
what they can seek. Idaho's “remedy” section is Section
6–2105, and its “relief” section is Section 6–2106. Florida,
however, puts both sections together in one statute with
two sub-divisions—Florida Statute § 448.103(1) and (2)—
entitled “Employee's remedy; relief.”
*3 The difference in the remedy sections of Florida's
and Idaho's Whistleblower Acts is mainly structural—
not substantive. That is, Idaho's remedy section itself
states that employees may sue for “injunctive relief or
actual damages, or both,....” I.C. § 6–2105, while Florida's
remedy section just refers readers to the relief section,
indicating that employees may sue “for relief as set forth in
sub-section (2) [the relief section] ....”(emphasis added).
So in the Florida statute, the reader has to jump to the
relief section to figure out that employees can sue for
compensatory damages. Idaho already said that in its
remedy section, so the fact that a plaintiff's ability to seek
actual damages for injury or loss is not restated in Idaho's
relief section is irrelevant.
The Court ultimately concludes that if the Idaho
legislature wanted to restrict whistleblower plaintiffs to
the remedies listed in Section 6–2106, it would have
said exactly that. In that regard, it is useful to compare
Idaho's whistleblower statute to New York's. The New
York whistleblower statute has a “relief” section almost
identical to Idaho's—and neither lists compensatory
damages as part of the relief that may be ordered. Compare
I.C. § 6–2106(1) to (6) with N.Y. Labor Law § 740(5)(a)
to (e) (McKinney). But the two states' “remedy” sections
are sharply different. Whereas the Idaho statute broadly
states that employees alleging violations “may bring a
civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or damages,
or both,” the New York statute expressly states that
plaintiffs can obtain only those types of relief set out in
the “relief” section. See N.Y. Labor Law § 740(4)(a). So
if the Court were construing a statute similar to New
York's, the City's argument would be more persuasive. But
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Idaho's Whistleblower Act is simply not susceptible to the
meaning the City gives it.
To the contrary, the Court reads Idaho's relief section
as expanding, rather than restricting, the types of relief
available in a whistleblower action. The relief section
makes clear that, in addition to traditional remedies, a
court may order other remedies above and beyond those
generally available to tort plaintiffs. A good example
is the language that gives the trial court authority
to order reinstatement, including reinstatement of full
fringe benefits and seniority rights. Reinstatement is not
a remedy commonly available to tort plaintiffs. The
Court therefore does not agree that Idaho's legislature
intended the relief section to limit the types of traditional
compensatory damages available for Whistleblower Act
violations.

B. Pleading Special Damages
Alternatively, the City says Brown should be precluded
from introducing evidence of the “special damages”
itemized above (expenses related to looking for a job,
moving, renting a storage unit, filing bankruptcy, and
buying a car) because these damages were not specifically
listed in the complaint. Again, the Court is not persuaded.
*4 Under federal pleading standards, “[g]eneral damages
typically are those elements of injury that are the
proximate and foreseeable consequence of defendant's
conduct. Special damages are those elements of damages
that are the natural, but not the necessary or usual,
consequence of defendant's conduct, and typically stem
from and depend upon the particular circumstances of the
case.” 5A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller et al.
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310 (3d ed.2005) (internal
footnote citations omitted). Unless the existence of special
damages is an essential ingredient of plaintiff's claim for
relief, “the purpose of requiring that special damages be

specifically pleaded is to protect the defendant against
being surprised at trial by the extent and character of the
plaintiff's claim.” Id.; see also Tipton v. Mill Creek Gravel,
Inc., 373 F.3d 913, 922 n. 10 (8th Cir.2004). Consequently,
where the alleged special damages are not an essential
element of the underlying claim, “considerable liberality is
the appropriate principle of construction” in assessing the
sufficiency of these allegations. Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1311.
Here, in the prayer for relief, plaintiff requested “general
and special” damages. These minimal allegations arguably
put the City on notice that plaintiff would be seeking
special damages. But even assuming they did not, the
purpose of the pleading rule has been served: it appears
discovery was conducted on these specific types of
damages and the City is not claiming it will be surprised
at trial by introduction of such evidence. The Court will
therefore deny the motion in limine based on alleged
pleading deficiency.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion in Limine (Dkt.61) is DENIED in
part, and otherwise MOOT.
2. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (Dkt.63) is DENIED.
3. Defendant's Motion in Limine re Insurance Coverage
(Dkt.67) is MOOT.

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 4522728

Footnotes

1
2

Plaintiff has also noted his objections to certain exhibits. The Court has reviewed those objections and will make those
determinations as the exhibits are introduced.
In full, Idaho Code § 6–2105 provides:
A court, in rendering a judgment brought under this chapter, may order any or all of the following:
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of this act;
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the adverse action, or to an equivalent position;
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights;
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration;
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(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), which shall be submitted to the state
treasurer for deposit in the general fund.

End of Document
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
EDWARD J. LODGE, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION
*1 The Court has before it plaintiff's and defendants'
motions in limine (Dkt.78, 82). The facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and
record, and oral argument will not aid the decisionmaking process. The Court will therefore rule without a
hearing.
The parties should be aware, however, that in limine
rulings are provisional. The Court might change its mind
in the context of the trial, and will therefore entertain
objections to individual proffers of evidence during trial,
even if those proffers fall within the scope of this order.
However, the parties are directed to raise these issues in
advance, outside the presence of the jury.

LEGAL STANDARD
Trial judges are afforded wide discretion in determining
whether evidence is relevant. United States v. Alvarez,
358 F.3d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir.2004) (citing United States
v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir.1983)). Because
“[a]n in limine order precluding the admission of evidence
or testimony is an evidentiary ruling, ... a district court
has discretion in ruling on a motion in limine.” United
States v. Ravel, 930 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.1991) (citations
omitted).
As already noted, in limine rulings “are not binding on
the trial judge [who] may always change his mind during
the course of a trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753,
758 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000); accord
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83
L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). Further, just because the Court denies
a motion seeking to exclude evidence “does not necessarily
mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be
admitted to trial. Denial merely means that without the
context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether
the evidence in question should be excluded.” Indiana
Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 844, 846
(N.D.Ohio 2004).

PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
1. The Probable–Cause Determination
In his first motion in limine, plaintiff seeks an order
allowing him to introduce the Idaho Human Rights
Commission's probable-cause determination. See May
2009 Letter and Summary of Investigation (“Probable–
Cause Determination”), Ex. A to Plaintiff's Motion, Dkt.
79–1.
In Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co., 656 F.2d
502, 504 (9th Cir.1981), the Ninth Circuit held that a
plaintiff has a “right to introduce an EEOC probable
cause determination in a Title VII lawsuit, regardless of
what other claims are asserted, or whether the case is tried
before a judge or jury.” Id. at 505. The Ninth Circuit later
indicated “the Plummer ruling is not restricted solely to
EEOC findings of probable cause but extends to similar
administrative determinations, ....” Heyne v. Caruso, 69
F.3d 1475, 1483 (9th Cir.1995).
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Notwithstanding Plummer, defendants argue that the
Commision's probable-cause determination should be
excluded because it (1) bears “little to no relevance to
Plaintiff's only [viable] promotion claim”; (2) is “rife with
inaccuracies and is incomplete, internally inconsistent,
and contradicted by sworn testimony—in other words
it is untrustworthy”; and (3) is unduly prejudicial under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The Court is not persuaded
by these arguments.

a) Relevance
*2 As for the first argument—relevance—defendants
note that although Garcia was passed over for promotion
three times (in June 2006, in January 2007, and again
in May 2007), he has just one actionable promotiondenial claim, related to the May 2007 denial. This Court
previously ruled that the claims related to the first two
promotions are time-barred.
The probable-cause determination, however, discusses all
three promotions. Moreover, defendants interpret the
determination as implicitly finding that racial bias did
not motivate the only actionable promotion denial (the
May 2007 denial) because (1) the report determined
that defendants were not liable “concerning the issue
of wages” after May 2007, and (2) elsewhere the
report notes that the person who was promoted instead
of Garcia in May 2007 had “both mechanical and
supervisory experience”—unlike the persons who were
previously promoted instead of Garcia. Probable–Cause
Determination, at 6, 7. Defendants thus argue that the
entire report is irrelevant.
The Court disagrees. First, as defendants seem to concede,
the report could be read as concluding that Mr. Allen
discriminated against Garcia with respect to all three
promotion denials—not just the last one. In fact, the
report includes a blanket statement that “national origin
was a motivating factor in Mr. Allen's decision ... not
to promote Complainant ....” Dkt. 79–1, at 7. Second,
looking at the issue more broadly, evidence of the timebarred promotion denials is admissible as background
evidence to support the timely promotion claim. 1 See,
e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2006).

Defendants next contend that the report is not trustworthy
and should therefore be excluded under Rule 803(6) and/
or 803(8)(c).
In the Ninth Circuit, the trial court begins with a
presumption that the disputed report is trustworthy.
See Montiel v. City of L.A., 2 F.3d 335, 341 (9th
Cir.1993); Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350,
352 (9th Cir.1992). The party opposing introduction
of the evidence must present enough negative factors
to persuade the court that the report should not be
admitted. Johnson, 982 F.2d at 352. This is because the
court assumes that public officials perform their duties
properly without motive or interest other than to submit
accurate and fair reports. Id. at 352–53. Further, “[t]he
role of the court in determining trustworthiness is not to
assess the report's credibility, but to evaluate whether the
report was compiled or prepared in a way that indicates
its reliability.” Hedgepeth v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan
of Northwest, 76 F.3d 386 (9th Cir.1996) (unpublished
disposition) (citing Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate, Inc., 933
F.2d 1300, 1305–08 (5th Cir.1991)).
The Court is satisfied that the probable-cause
determination meets the level of trustworthiness required.
Significantly, the only case authority defendants cite in
support of their trustworthiness argument—Hedgepeth v.
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Northwest, 76 F.3d 386,
1996 WL 29252, at *2 (9th Cir.1996) (unpublished table
disposition)—is easily distinguishable. In that case, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that an administrative finding
issued by the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries'
Civil Rights Division (BOLI) was untrustworthy “on its
face” because
*3 [t]he report admits the investigator had access to
almost no relevant information from Kaiser because
Kaiser “has not permitted an opportunity for [its
nondiscriminatory] reasons to be tested for pretext.”
The report simply concludes “[i]n the absence of
satisfactory evidence to the contrary, it appears that
Complainant's age and opposition to unlawful practices
were key factors in Respondent's decision to terminate
Complainant.” Since the author concedes he was unable
to fully investigate the claim, the BOLI determination
is inadmissible under FRE 803(8)(c).
Id. (emphasis added).

b) Trustworthiness
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There are no such pervasive problems with the report
at issue here. In one instance, the report indicates that
defendant PSI “provided limited wage data ....” Probable–
Cause Determination at 6 (emphasis added); see also Opp.,
Dkt. 91, at 4 (indicating that the report only considered
four other employees' salary, when there were actually
11 other employees). But having access to “limited”
wage data is a far cry from having “almost no relevant
information.”
Further, although defendants say the report is “rife” with
inaccuracies, many of the listed inaccuracies are minor.
See, e.g., Opp., Dkt. 91, at 7 (observing that the report
wrongly notes, at one point that the plaintiff was hired
on October 12, 2005, but elsewhere correctly notes that
plaintiff was hired on November 4, 2005). And while
other inaccuracies are more significant, inaccuracies do
not pervade the report, nor are they so serious as to
convince the Court that the report is not trustworthy.
Defendants also point out that: (1) some witnesses said
one thing to the investigator, and then contradicted
themselves in their depositions; and (2) other evidence will
undermine the report. But the fact that deponents may
have changed their story after talking to the investigator,
or that other witnesses might have contradictory
information, does not mean the report itself was prepared
in such a way to indicate it is not trustworthy.
In sum, defendants' attacks on the determination go more
to the weight the jury should give to the determination
than to its trustworthiness. And as Plummer observed:
The defendant, of course, is free
to present evidence refuting the
findings of the EEOC and may
point out deficiencies in the EEOC
determination on remand [back to
the trial court.] Such evidence would
go to the weight to be given by
the trier of fact to the EEOC
determination.
656 F.3d at 505 n. 9.

c) Rule 403(b)
Finally, the Court overrules defendants' Rule 403
objection. The Ninth Circuit has “mandate[d]” that
probable-cause determinations by the EEOC and other

similar determinations be admitted into evidence.
See Heyne, 69 F.3d at 1483 (referring to “our
mandate regarding the admissibility of administrative
determinations outlined in Plummer” ). In issuing that
mandate, Plummer conclusively found that the prejudicial
effect of the probable-cause determination far outweighed
the prejudicial effect it may have on a jury. 656 F.3d
at 504–05; see also Bradshaw v. Zoological Society, 569
F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.1978). Plummer thus controls.
Moreover, even in the absence of Plummer, the Court is
not persuaded that the prejudicial effect of the probablecause determination outweighs its probative value.

2. The June 2006 and January 2007 Promotion Denials
*4 Garcia's second motion in limine seeks an order
allowing him to introduce evidence regarding the two
time-barred promotion denials.
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held
that time-barred conduct may be offered as evidence of
discriminatory intent to support timely claims. See Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122
S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2006); United Airlines Inc.
v. Evans, 431 U.S. 533, 558 (1977); Lyons v. England,
307 F.3d 1092, 1111 (9th Cir.2002) (time-barred acts of
employment discrimination “relevant as background and
may be considered by the trier of fact in assessing the
defendant's liability ....”).
Garcia's failure to get promoted in June 2006 and
January 2007 involve the same decision-maker who
passed over Garcia for promotion in May 2007. Further,
the two earlier denials occurred within a year of the
later, actionable denial. The Court will therefore allow
plaintiff to introduce evidence relating to the earlier
promotions as background evidence relevant to his timely
promotion-denial claim. 2 Cf. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113
(“relevant background evidence, such as statements by a
decisionmaker or earlier decisions typifying the retaliation
involved, may be considered to assess liability on the
timely alleged action”). The Court has determined that
any prejudicial effect of this evidence is outweighed by
its probative value. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. Nevertheless, to
ensure that the jury is not confused as to which claims
are actionable in this case, the Court will read, when
necessary, an appropriate limiting instruction.
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Finally, the Court rejects defendants' argument that this
evidence should be barred under Rule 404(b) argument.
Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, ... intent, ....
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(2) (emphasis added). As the italicized
portion demonstrates, Rule 404(b) actually supports
considering the time-barred evidence for purposes of
establishing discriminatory intent. See, e.g. Oest v. Illinois
Dept. of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 614 n. 4 (7th Cir.2001);
Pleasants v. Albaugh, 258 F.Supp.2d 53 (D.D.C.2003).

3. Single Employer
Plaintiff's third motion in limine seeks to introduce
evidence showing that defendants PSI and WCI are a
“single employer.” Here, plaintiffs refer to the Ninth
Circuit's four-part single-employer test, which includes
these factors: “(1) interrelated operations, (2) common
management, (3) centralized control of labor relations,
and (4) common ownership or financial control.” Morgan
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir.1989).
Defendants' opposition is not helpful. They concede that
“plaintiff can introduce evidence in an attempt to establish
defendants' liability,” Opp. at 14, but then go on to argue
that the single-employer standard is irrelevant. What they
do not do—at least in their opposition to the motion
in limine—is explain what standard applies, and what
evidence is relevant to that standard. In their trial brief,
however defendants assert that plaintiff must satisfy the
joint employer test, and they articulate four relevant
factors: “whether the alleged joint employer (1) supervised
the employees; (2) had the power to hire and fire; (3) had
the power to discipline; and (4) supervised the employees'
worksite.” Defendants' Trial Memo., Dkt. 92, at 7 (citing
Buttars v. Creekside Home Health, Inc., No. 07–0204–
E–BLW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75700, at *4, 2008 WL
4411414 (D.Idaho Sept.25, 2008)).
*5 In absence of a more thorough explanation
from defendants, it appears that the evidence plaintiff
references in his motion is admissible to establish both

defendants' liability, and the Court will permit such
evidence at trial. However, plaintiff's counsel is instructed
to refrain from using the term “single employer” at trial.

4. Employment Records
Lastly, plaintiff asks the Court to exclude his employment
records related to other employers, as well as employment
records for Tim Bagley and Biff Lee. Plaintiff does
not refer to any specific records; he seeks a blanket
exclusionary order. Plaintiff argues that these types
of records are “irrelevant, will waste time, ... are
potentially prejudicial [and] ... are inadmissible character
evidence ....” Mot., at 9. Plaintiff also asserts that some of
the subpoenas used to get these documents were untimely.
The Court will address the timeliness argument first, and
then turn to the substantive arguments.

a) Timeliness
The discovery cutoff in this case was March 18, 2011.
In late fall 2010, defendants subpoenaed employment
records from several of plaintiff's former and subsequent
employers. Around the same time, defendants also
subpoenaed employment records from other PSI
employees who are friendly to plaintiff. See Ex. H to
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine.
A few subpoenas came down to the wire; they were issued
on March 17, 2011—one day before the discovery cutoff
—and called for productions in April 2011. Defendants
say they did not serve at least one of these subpoenas
until so late because they did not know about that
particular employer until a March 12, 2011 deposition.
Significantly, plaintiff did not promptly complain about
these subpoenas or move to quash them. Instead, he
waited until the eve of trial to raise the issue. Under these
circumstances, the Court will not exclude employment
records due to issues surrounding the timeliness of the
subpoenas. 3

b) Garcia's Employment Records
Similarly, the Court will not exclude the employment
records (with one specific exception, discussed below)
based on plaintiff's substantive arguments.
Dealing first with plaintiff's own records from former
employers, the Court finds these records to be relevant to
this dispute, to the extent they bear on Garcia's mechanic
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or supervisory experience (or lack thereof). Specifically,
they are relevant to whether Garcia was qualified for
the promotions he did not receive. Garcia asserts he was
qualified for those promotions. Defendants are entitled
to refute that assertion. The Court will therefore deny
Garcia's request for a blanket order excluding all his
employment records.
Garcia argues that some of these records should
be excluded as inadmissible character evidence under
Rule 608. Apparently, Garcia did not list all of his
former employers in the appropriate section of his PSI
employment application. He argues that defendants are
improperly seeking to introduce some of the employment
records to show that he is untruthful. See Fed.R.Evid.
608. Defendants, however, correctly point out that
the documents are admissible for another purpose.
Specifically, if plaintiff failed to list mechanic jobs on his
PSI application—and he was fired from those jobs—that
evidence speaks to his qualifications and, thus, may refute
plaintiff's contention that he was discriminated against.
The Court will therefore deny plaintiff's motion to the
extent it seeks to broadly exclude all employment records.
*6 The Court will, however, exclude records regarding
plaintiff's employment with Aslett Electric, Inc. (These
are the only employment records plaintiff specifically
discussed in his motion.) When Garcia applied for a job
with PSI, he did not list Aslett as a former employer,
possibly because he only worked for that company for a
couple months, total, and he was ultimately fired from
Aslett. See Employment App., Ex. K to Opp., Dkt 91–12,
at 3.
The Aslett records do not seem relevant to this lawsuit.
First, it is unclear what Garcia actually did for Aslett.
The job descriptions are cryptic, describing him first as a
“laborer” and then as an “operator.” He was fired from
the “operator” job, and another cryptic explanation is
given for that: “safety hazard.” If Garcia was a mechanic
for Aslett, then the November 2005 firing may be relevant
to refute his contention that he was a qualified mechanic.
Otherwise, the records are irrelevant.
Defendants do not explain what Garcia did at Aslett, but
they contend that the Aslett records are relevant because
Garcia earned $13 per hour at that company, which was
the exact amount he received when he started working
for defendants. This argument is flawed, however, because

defendants presumably did not even know about Garcia's
employment with Aslett when they decided his starting
pay rate.
In sum, the Court will grant plaintiff's motion to
exclude the Aslett records because they are not relevant.
Otherwise, the Court denies plaintiff's motion to exclude
employment records.

c) Bagley's Employment Records
The Court will also deny plaintiff's motion as it relates
to Tim Bagley's employment records. 4 Bagley testified
in his deposition that he did not feel qualified for the
promotion he received instead of Garcia, yet after he left
defendants' employ, he sent a letter to another prospective
employer. Many letters like this contain some degree of
puffery and, apparently, Bagley's was no exception. He
expounded upon his qualifications. Defendants say this
will undermine the plaintiffs' argument that Garcia should
have received the promotion that went to Bagley. The
Court finds that this evidence is relevant and will therefore
allow it.

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE
1. Evidence Relating to Defendants' Hiring and
Compensation Decisions After Plaintiff's December 2007
Resignation
In their first motion in limine, defendants ask the Court to
exclude evidence regarding pay and hiring decisions after
Garcia's December 2007 resignation under Federal Rule
of Evidence 402. They also seek to exclude pay and hiring
decisions made by David Grantham. The Court will deny
this motion.
As noted, Garcia resigned in December 2007. Up until
November 2007, Don Allen decided what pay Garcia
would receive, as well as whether he would be promoted,
with Vice President Eric Merrill having “some input” on
those decisions. Allen, however, quit in November 2007
(the month before Garcia quit) and Merrill moved out of
his role as VP in October 2007. The upshot was that as of
around November 2007, David Grantham decided which
mechanics would be hired and what those mechanics
would be paid. Ed McCartney worked with Grantham on
these decisions.
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*7 Defendants first argue that because Grantham did
not make any decisions regarding plaintiff, his decisions
are entirely irrelevant. The Court rejects this argument
because Garcia alleges that in November 2007, Grantham
rejected his and McCartney's request that Garcia's pay be
increased to the planned rate for new hires.
Next, defendants argue that any decisions after plaintiff
resigned are irrelevant. Here, defendants argue that
because Plaintiff cannot seek wages for the postDecember 2007 period, pay and hiring decisions postDecember 2007 are irrelevant. The Court rejects this
argument as well. Even assuming plaintiff is barred from
seeking post-December 2007 wages, this does not convince
the Court that pay and hiring decisions after that date are
irrelevant to plaintiff's claims that he was paid too little.
To give an obvious example—and this is what plaintiff
says happened—if defendants hired individuals who were
essentially equal to plaintiff shortly after he left, but paid
them significantly more, this might tend to prove that
plaintiff was in fact discriminated against.
The Court is not persuaded that this evidence would be
“extensive and complex.” For example, defendants point
out that plaintiff wants to introduce evidence of “no less
than four separate mechanic hires in 2008” and then have
the jury compare those resumes with his own. All things
are relative, but that does not seem to be a particularly
“extensive or complex” evidentiary task. The Court will
deny defendants' motion to exclude this evidence under
Rule 403.

2. Evidence of Emotional Distress
In their second motion in limine, defendants seek to
exclude emotional-distress evidence. Specifically, Garcia
alleges he suffered emotional distress after he was passed
over for promotion in May 2007. Defendants argue
that this evidence should be excluded because emotional
distress damages are not expressly permitted under the
Idaho Human Rights Act. See Idaho Code § 67–5908
(setting forth a non-exhaustive list of available remedies).
The Court will deny this motion.
The remedies provision of the Idaho Human Rights
statute does not limit the type of remedies available to
plaintiffs. See Idaho Code § 67–5908. Rather, before
listing specific remedies, it states that “[s]uch remedies
may include, but are not limited to: ....” various listed

remedies. 5 Id. § 67–5908(3). Further, the express purpose
of the Idaho Human Rights Act is to execute the policies
embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
enacted Title VII. See Idaho Code § 67–5901. As originally
enacted, Title VII did not allow recovery of compensatory
damages, but in 1991 Congress amended Title VII by
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which specifically
allows plaintiffs to recovery compensatory damages.
Generally speaking, the Idaho Supreme Court has broadly
interpreted the remedies provision of the Idaho Human
Rights Act. For example, in O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho
796, 810 P.2d 1082, 1097 (Idaho 1991), the court held that
front pay is an admissible element of damages under the
Act, although the Act does not expressly include the term
“front pay.” The court reasoned that “actual damages”—
which are a specifically listed remedy—are “commonly
understood as those actual losses caused by the conduct at
issue,” which included front pay. Id.
*8 And, more to the point here, in Paterson v. Idaho,
128 Idaho 494, 915 P.2d 724, 733 (Idaho 1996), the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed emotional distress damages
under the Idaho Human Rights Act. The court rejected
defendants' arguments that such damages were improper
because the trial court had dismissed plaintiff's separate
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
Court reasoned that while “Paterson's claim may not have
risen to the level necessary to meet the legal elements
required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress
cause of action,” that fact “does not block her recovery
for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered as a
result of her work environment.” Id. at 733.
Defendants correctly point out that in Paterson, (1) the
parties assumed compensatory damages were available
and, (2) the defendants did not challenge an instruction
that “directed the jury, upon a finding of liability,
to award Paterson compensatory damages for ‘mental
pain and suffering, including mortification, humiliation,
and embarrassment resulting from the hostile working
environment.’ ” Id. Nonetheless, this Court finds Paterson
persuasive for the proposition that emotional distress
damages are recoverable under the Idaho Human Rights
Act.
That would be the end of the matter, but for the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision in Stout v. Key Training Corp.,
144 Idaho 195, 158 P.3d 971 (2007). Stout does not address
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emotional distress damages under the Idaho Human
Rights Act. But it does find that attorneys' fees are not
recoverable under the Act because attorneys' fees—like
emotional distress damages—are not a specifically listed
remedy. The court concluded that the Idaho legislature
must not have intended plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees
because the Human Rights Act does not include attorneys'
fees, even though the Civil Rights Act did allow attorneys'
fees at that time. As the court put it,
[T]he federal Civil Rights Act
provision allowing for an award of
attorney fees had been enacted long
before the Idaho Human Rights Act
remedy provision. Yet, the Idaho
legislature chose not to include
attorney fees in its remedy provision.
Id. at 973–74 (internal footnote omitted)
By analogy, the Idaho legislature did not amend the
Act to include compensatory damages after Congress
so amended Title VII. Defendants thus conclude that
the legislature must not intend for plaintiffs to recover
emotional distress damages under the act.
This argument is unavailing. First, Stout does not directly
control here as it does not address emotional distress
damages. Second, the Court finds it significant that Stout
focused on attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees are not a
component of “actual damages” suffered by a plaintiff due
to the underlying event; they are a cost of enforcing a legal
right. Here, Garcia is not seeking to recover the cost of
enforcing the act; he is seeking “actual damages,”—which
are permitted under the Act. See Idaho Code § 67–5908(3).
*9 In sum, the Court concludes that Garcia may seek
emotional distress damages. Accord Green v. Bannock
Reg'l Med. Ctr., Case No. 91–0149–LMB (Mar. 15,
1993) (transcript of Judge Boyle's oral decision permitting
emotional distress damages under the Act).

3. The Death of Plaintiff's Daughter
Plaintiff was prompted to move to Idaho after his
daughter tragically died. The Court will exclude this
evidence under Rules 401, 402, and 403. The Court is not
persuaded by plaintiff's arguments to the contrary. See
Opp., at 10–11.

4. Sexual Harassment
The Court will exclude evidence regarding accusations
that Don Allen sexually harassed employees under Rules
401, 402, and 403. In any event, plaintiff indicated that
he did not intend to question Allen regarding these
allegations “unless Defendants open the door on this
line of questioning or it becomes relevant for rebuttal/
impeachment purposes.” Opp., at 11.

5. Criminal Backgrounds of other WCI or PSI employees
At one point in this litigation, defendants asserted that
plaintiff had no claim because they would have fired
him anyway if they had known of information that later
learned (presumably, that he omitted information on his
resume). Defendants no longer need to assert this theory
because of the Court's summary judgment ruling. But
they are now concerned that plaintiff will seek to show
that other employees—who, presumably, have not been
fired—omitted information or otherwise lied on their
employment applications.
The Court agrees that this evidence is not relevant to
plaintiff's remaining claim and will therefore exclude the
evidence under Rules 401, 402, and 403. The Court is
not persuaded to admit evidence regarding the falsity of
other employees' applications simply because plaintiff's
applications may be tested within the bounds of this
lawsuit.

6. Serrano's Allegations of Discrimination
The fact that another employee, Phillip Serrano, accused
Grantham of discriminating against him around the same
time Grantham allegedly discriminated against Garcia
is admissible for the purpose of allowing Garcia to
establish discriminatory intent. See Fed.R.Evid. 402 &
404(b); Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir.1995)
(citing Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156
(10th Cir.1990) (“As a general rule, the testimony of
other employees about their treatment by the defendant
[employer] is relevant to the issue of the employer's
discriminatory intent.”)).

CONCLUSION
In constructing this Order, the Court has endeavored
to provide to the parties as much guidance as possible
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regarding the Court's understanding of the law that
applies to this case and the evidence as the parties have
represented they intend to rely upon it at trial. In doing so,
the Court has entered rulings where it can but for the most
part the determination as to the admissibility of particular
items of evidence will have to be made during the course
of the trial when the Court able to view the evidence in the
context in which it is being offered. That being the case, the
rulings made in this Order are preliminary. If the evidence
presented at trial differs, the Court reserves the right
to rule on the admissibility of the evidence accordingly
at trial. The parties are directed to notify the Court in
advance of any evidentiary issues being raised so that the
Court can take up such matters outside of the presence of
the jury and to eliminate any undue delay during the trial.

ORDER
*10 It is ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (Dkt.78) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part, as explained herein.
2. Defendants' Motion in Limine (Dkt.82) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part, as explained herein.

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 2359496

Footnotes

1
2
3

4
5

This issue is discussed more thoroughly below, in the Court's ruling on plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2
Given this ruling, the Court need not address plaintiffs' argument that this evidence is independently admissible to support
his disparate-treatment claim.
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded to exclude records from Aslett Electric, Inc. (one of Garcia's former employers) on
the technical grounds plaintiff asserts. The Court will not engage in a detailed discussion here, however, because it has
determined that the Aslett records are irrelevant. If, however, the Court changes its mind on relevance, suffice it to say
that plaintiff's technical arguments regarding the Aslett documents are not convincing.
Defendants focused mainly on their intent to introduce Tim Bagley's employment records. The Court will therefore restrict
this ruling to Bagley at this point, although presumably the order related to Bagley will provide the litigants with some
general guidance on the question of other employees.
In full, Idaho Code § 67–5908(3) states:
In a civil action filed by the commission or filed directly by the person alleging unlawful discrimination, if the court finds
that unlawful discrimination has occurred, its judgment shall specify an appropriate remedy or remedies therefor. Such
remedies may include, but are not limited to:
(a) An order to cease and desist from the unlawful practice specified in the order;
(b) An order to employ, reinstate, promote or grant other employment benefits to a victim of unlawful employment
discrimination;
(c) An order for actual damages including lost wages and benefits, provided that such back pay liability shall not accrue
from a date more than two (2) years prior to the filing of the complaint with the commission or the district court,
whichever occurs first;
(d) An order to accept or reinstate such a person in a union;
(e) An order for punitive damages, not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each willful violation of this chapter.

End of Document
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